Technology Kill 2 Succeed Pdf


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Kill 2 Succeed Pdf

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Because the crystal-based approach is so innovative, enthusiasm quickly grows. Over the next several years, the project enjoys both successes and setbacks.

The paper filler product is superior in a number of ways to existing fillers, and the crystals turn out to have another potential application in plastics manufacturing. Aussedat Rey agrees to pay for further paper filler tests. These highlight several problems. The product has the potential to clog certain papermaking machines. And it is not concentrated enough, making it relatively expensive for customers to use. Researchers are confident, however, that these problems can be solved.

But the full range of products for paper, paint, and plastics taken together should be.

Unfortunately, only the paper filler has advanced beyond the laboratory stage. Still, people are eager to get the product to market.

This tentative go-ahead is greeted enthusiastically by project members. He raises concerns about remaining technical challenges, especially after a more-concentrated version of the paper filler fails a new test at Aussedat Rey. But his concerns are generally ignored because of his lack of experience in industrial products. In fact, others involved in the project repeatedly remind him of this fact.

He stops raising questions—and ultimately resigns.

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Meanwhile, Aussedat Rey is showing less interest in the paper filler and repeatedly delays further trials. It later will sever its relationship with Lafarge because the price of the paper filler is too high. And yet, after a presentation by members of the project, top management gives the plant a green light, and it is inaugurated in September But the new plant remains idle, as no product has yet emerged from the lab that is ready for production and no customer or partner has been found to fund further tests.

He forms a task force to formally evaluate the viability of the project. For example, although an initial market study was done, there have been no follow-ups to gauge demand for a product that is now likely to lack some of the features originally envisioned.

The new director of operations recommends terminating the project. Most team members agree with the factual findings, but many reject the recommendation that the project be killed. So, although top management stops development of the paper filler, it authorizes continued research on products to be used in paper coating and plastics manufacturing.

At the end of , however, a test of the paper-coating product produces poor results and offers little hope that it can be improved. So what got into the decision makers at these two companies?

Why did Essilor persist with the development of its new lens in the face of so much negative evidence? Why did Lafarge build a brand-new production facility before determining whether its gypsum crystal additive had a future in the marketplace? These were not cases of bureaucratic inertia. If anything, the procedures and controls over these projects were too lax rather than too unresponsive or inflexible. Nor were these cases in which project champions were flogging a dead horse to justify their original touting of it.

What the many interviews and myriad contemporary documents reveal in both companies is the power, and troublesome implications, of a very human impulse: In both companies, this belief was held not just by a handful of individuals but by much of their organizations.

How does that happen? The original true believer is a project champion, who holds an unyielding conviction—based, often as not, on a hunch rather than on strong evidence—that a project will succeed. This belief then spreads to others; how quickly and with what intensity depends on a number of factors. Some of these are organizational and some are particular to the champion—for example, his personal credibility and charisma and the robustness and range of his social network within the company.

Belief in a project is all the more contagious when its ultimate success is something that people greatly desire. For both Essilor and Lafarge, the two projects furthered important companywide goals: But a project can also satisfy individual desires, ones that are often quite various and even potentially conflicting. Some senior executives saw the composite glass-and-plastic lens as a way to strengthen corporate culture: Essilor was born from the merger of Essel, a glass-lens manufacturer, and Silor, a rival that made plastic lenses, and the two divisions still competed against each other.

Others saw it as a strategically important move beyond building materials. In both companies, the collective belief served as an umbrella that sheltered an array of hopes and dreams; those, in turn, worked together to reinforce the collective belief. Once a collective belief takes hold, it tends to perpetuate itself.


For one thing, groups have a way of drowning out dissent. Eventually, they stopped raising questions. This self-censorship gave the groups an illusion of unanimity and invulnerability, which in turn helped sustain individual belief. Curiously, setbacks, rather than undermining faith, often drive people to work all the harder to maintain it.

This intensity is not surprising, given the emotional attachment people feel for a project they passionately believe in. As one Essilor manager said of an early version of the lens: The product existed!

It was beautiful. It was too hard. At Essilor, some managers explained away the lukewarm initial demand for the lens as an aberration related to the soon-to-be-solved technical problem of layer separation, forgetting that the market was generally unaware of this problem. At Lafarge, one manager knew that the decision to build the plant was probably premature, given the available test results for the product, but he said nothing because he was eager to move forward on an enterprise everyone was certain would succeed.

Managers at both companies referred to the blindness that resulted from their faith in the projects. This blindness persists in part because collective belief undermines normal organizational procedures and safeguards.

For one thing, the enthusiasm generated by faith in a project can lead to an unrealistically tight development timetable. Essilor canceled some tests and substituted shorter, less reliable ones in order to stick to its aggressive development schedule.

A test to see how durable the lenses remained over time, for example, was shortened from two years to six months. Enthusiasm also can result in lenient procedures for reviewing the viability of a product throughout its development. Furthermore, widespread enthusiasm can lead to the formation of a project team filled with, and overseen by, uncritical boosters of the initiative.

Together, these factors can create a reinforcing chain that perpetuates collective belief. In a sense, the project takes on a life of its own. In your own company, you have undoubtedly known projects that dragged on but went nowhere. You may be aware of a handful of bad projects that are grinding along, or even picking up speed, right now.

How can companies prevent this sort of thing? But they could have done a number of things that would have made them better able to judge their progress and counteract the distorting effects of collective belief.

Two kinds of safeguards can be built into a project before it even gets under way.

Another one requires a manager involved in a project to play an important, new role. All too often, project teams are self-selected. They include people who have volunteered because they share an initial enthusiasm for the project.

They may even have worked together on successful projects in the past. In fact, they know them too well. As they interact, there are none of the awkward missteps or misunderstandings that can produce unexpected insights—or signs of trouble.

Warning flags that do appear may be ignored; after all, everyone is rooting for something they believe in. Executives launching a project would do well, then, to include skeptics along with believers in the project teams from the outset, paying particular attention to those who will be directly involved in making decisions. Then, over the course of the initiative, some decision makers should be replaced with others, who will look at the project with fresh eyes.

At Essilor and Lafarge, top management populated the projects with true believers. In fact, in both cases, the sole initial critics joined the projects somewhat by chance.

Only when turnover occurred for reasons unrelated to the project—retirement, health problems, the restructuring of a companywide research function—was the cohesiveness of the project groups disrupted and some measure of objectivity introduced. From the start, no matter how exciting or important a project is, a company needs to make sure that its control procedures and criteria for evaluating project viability at each stage of development are truly working—that they are clearly defined, rigorous, and actually met.

But they can easily forget to establish such structures at the beginning of a project that seems bound for glory. Or even if they do establish processes for good decision making, they can end up ignoring them—or the results—amid the excitement generated by a new project.

Lafarge executives concede that they failed to adhere to their own decision criteria when they went ahead and built the plant—although the criteria were vague enough to make this fairly easy to do. As one Essilor manager said: It was just a question of when. Sometimes it takes an individual, rather than growing evidence, to shake the collective belief of a project team. If the problem with unbridled enthusiasm starts as an unintended consequence of the legitimate work of a project champion, then what may be needed is a countervailing force—an exit champion.

Instead of simply raising questions about a project, they seek objective evidence showing that problems in fact exist. This allows them to challenge—or, given the ambiguity of existing data, conceivably even to confirm—the viability of a project. They then take action based on the data. At both Essilor and Lafarge, exit champions—the new research manager at Essilor, and the new operations director at Lafarge—joined the projects as evidence of their unpromising futures was mounting.

But supporters were still clinging to the shreds of positive evidence that occasionally emerged—or ignoring the evidence altogether. Had it not been for these exit champions, team members said later, the projects probably would have continued for months or even years. To be effective, an exit champion needs to be directly involved in the project; a negative assessment from someone based elsewhere in the company is too easy to dismiss as ill-informed or motivated by organizational rivalry.

The exit champion also needs a high degree of personal credibility. The managers at Essilor and Lafarge who had raised questions about the lens and paper filler during the early development stages lacked this credibility. The exit champions, by contrast, had been with their companies for a long time and were well regarded by top management. Both had a strong network of people at different levels of the company ready to provide support when they decided the project should be killed.

What kind of person would willingly assume such a role? In fact, the exit champion faces inevitable hostility from project supporters; those at Essilor and Lafarge were variously described as villains or dream breakers. Such conflicts are interesting because in many ways the roles of the traditional project champion and the exit champion are similar. Just as innovations are unlikely to be implemented without champions, failing projects are unlikely to be halted without exit champions.

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Volume 2 contains even more custom alphabets and "real street hand-style" script by Los Angeles tattoo artist, Big Sleeps. Lettering Reference GuideBut this story starts in the summer of , when a similar breakthrough appears possible. In fact, in both cases, the sole initial critics joined the projects somewhat by chance.

Big Sleeps Lettering Book Pdf free download programs How can companies prevent this sort of thing? Why did Essilor persist with the development of its new lens in the face of so much negative evidence? Essilor has long been proud of its research.

Or even if they do establish processes for good decision making, they can end up ignoring them—or the results—amid the excitement generated by a new project. Customers are less enthusiastic: The other was an industrial additive used in manufacturing paper, paint, and plastics, developed by Lafarge, the largest producer of building materials. Project champions run a long-term risk of being wrong—something that will become clear only if a project ultimately fails.