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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Chomsky, Noam. Media control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda / Noam Chomsky. p. cm. NOAM CHOMSKY, from Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda OPEN (The Open Media Pamphlet Series) ISBN 1 . Media control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda by Noam Chomsky ; 5 editions; First published in ; Subjects: Mass media, Mass media and.

Noam Chomsky Media Control Pdf

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Noam Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Evaluation Download full-text PDF. A preview . Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda . Noam Chomsky's backpocket classic on wartime propaganda and opinion control begins by asserting two models of democracy—one in which the public. Main entry under title: Manufacturing Consent Noam Chomsky and the Media Thought Control in Democratic Societies. 18, 20, ,

It's grown quite a lot since the s.

Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda

In the s the dissident culture first of all was extremely slow in developing. There was no protest against the Indochina war until years after the United States had started bombing South Vietnam. When it did grow it was a very narrow dissident movement, mostly students and young people.

By the s that had changed considerably. Major popular move- ments had developed: In the s there was an even greater expansion to the sol- idarity movements, which is something very new and important in the history of at least American, and maybe even world dissidence. These were movements that not only protested but actually involved themselves, often intimately, in the lives of suffering peo- ple elsewhere.

They learned a great deal from it and had quite a civilizing effect on main- stream America. All of this has made a very large difference. Anyone who has been involved in this kind of activity for many years must be aware of this. I know myself that the kind of talks I give today in the most reac- tionary parts of the country — central Georgia, rural Kentucky, etc.

Now you can give them anywhere. People may agree or not agree, but at least they understand what you're talking about and there's some sort of common ground that you can pursue.

These are all signs of the civilizing effect, despite all the propaganda, despite all the efforts to control thought and manufacture consent. Nevertheless, people are acquiring an ability and a willingness to think things through.

Skepticism about power has grown, and attitudes have changed on many, many issues. It's kind of slow, maybe even glacial, but perceptible and important. Whether it's fast enough to make a significant difference in what happens in the world is another question. Just to take one familiar example of it: The famous gender gap. In the s attitudes of men and women were approximately the same on such matters as the "martial virtues" and the sickly inhibitions against the use of military force.

Nobody, neither men nor women, were suffering from those sickly inhibitions in the early s. The responses were the same. Everybody thought that the use of violence to suppress people out there was just right.

Over the years it's changed. The sickly inhibitions have increased all across the board.

Media Control

But meanwhile a gap has been growing, and by now it's a very substantial gap. Accord- ing to polls, it's something like twenty-five percent. What has happened? What has hap- pened is that there is some form of at least semi-organized popular movement that women are involved in — the feminist move- ment. Organization has its effects. It means that you discover that you're not alone.

Oth- ers have the same thoughts that you do.

You can reinforce your thoughts and learn more about what you think and believe. These are very informal movements, not like a mem- bership organizations, just a mood that involves interactions among people. It has a very noticeable effect. That's the danger of democracy: If organizations can develop, if people are no longer just glued to the tube, you may have all these funny thoughts arising in their heads, like sickly inhibitions against the use of military force.

That has to be overcome, but it hasn't been overcome. There is a very characteristic development going on in the United States now. It's not the first country in the world that's done this. There are growing domestic social and eco- nomic problems, in fact, maybe catastrophes. Nobody in power has any intention of doing anything about them. If you look at the domestic programs of the administrations of the past ten years — I include here the Democ- ratic opposition — there's really no serious pro- posal about what to do about the severe problems of health, education, homelessness, joblessness, crime, soaring criminal popula- tions, jails, deterioration in the inner cities — the whole raft of problems.

You all know about them, and they're all getting worse. Just in the two years that George Bush has been in office three million more children crossed the poverty line, the debt is zooming, educational standards are declining, real wages are now back to the level of about the late s for much of the population, and nobody's doing anything about it. In such circumstances you've got to divert the bewildered herd, because if they start noticing this they may not like it, since they're the ones suffering from it.

Just having them watch the Superbowl and the sitcoms may not be enough. You have to whip them up into fear of enemies. In the s Hitler whipped them into fear of the Jews and gypsies. You had to crush them to defend your- selves.

We have our ways, too. Over the last ten years, every year or two, some major monster is constructed that we have to defend ourselves against. There used to be one that was always readily available: The Russians. You could always defend yourself against the Russians.

But they're losing their attractiveness as an enemy, and it's getting harder and harder to use that one, so some new ones have to be conjured up. In fact, people have quite unfairly criticized George Bush for being unable to express or articulate what's really driving us now.

That's very unfair. Prior to about the mids, when you were asleep you would just play the record: But he lost that one and he's got to make up new ones, just like the Reaganite public relations apparatus did in the s.

So it was international terrorists and narco-traffickers and crazed Arabs and Saddam Hussein, the new Hitler, was going to conquer the world. They've got to keep coming up one after another. You frighten the population, ter- rorize them, intimidate them so that they're too afraid to travel and cower in fear. Then you have a magnificent victory over Grenada, Panama, or some other defenseless third- world army that you can pulverize before you ever bother to look at them — which is just what happened.

That gives relief. We were saved at the last minute. That's one of the ways in which you can keep the bewildered herd from paying attention to what's really going on around them, keep them diverted and con- trolled. The next one that's coming along, most likely, will be Cuba. That's going to require a continuation of the illegal economic warfare, possibly a revival of the extraordinary inter- national terrorism.

The most major interna- tional terrorism organized yet has been the Kennedy administration's Operation Mon- goose, then the things that followed along, against Cuba. There's been nothing remotely comparable to it except perhaps the war against Nicaragua, if you call that terrorism.

The World Court classified it as something more like aggression. There's always an ideo- logical offensive that builds up a chimerical monster, then campaigns to have it crushed. You can't go in if they can fight back. That's much too dangerous. But if you are sure that they will be crushed, maybe we'll knock that one off and heave another sigh of relief. In May , the memoirs of the released Cuban prisoner, Armando Valladares, came out. They quickly became a media sensation.

I'll give you a couple of quotes. The media described his revelations as "the definitive account of the vast system of torture and prison by which Cas- tro punishes and obliterates political opposi- tion. Castro was described as "a dictatorial goon. Remem- ber, this is the account of what happened to one man. Let's say it's all true. Let's raise no ques- tions about what happened to the one man who says he was tortured. At a White House cere- mony marking Human Rights Day, he was sin- gled out by Ronald Reagan for his courage in enduring the horrors and sadism of this bloody Cuban tyrant.

He was then appointed the U. Human Rights Commission, where he has been able to per- form signal services defending the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments against charges that they conduct atrocities so massive that they make anything he suffered look pretty minor. That's the way things stand. That was May It was interesting, and it tells you something about the manufacture of consent.

Books by Noam Chomsky

The same month, the surviving members of the Human Rights Group of El Sal- vador — the leaders had been killed — were arrested and tortured, including Herbert Anaya, who was the director.

They were sent to a prison — LaEsperanza hope Prison. While they were in prison they continued their human rights work. They were lawyers, they continued taking affidavits. There were prisoners in that prison. They got signed affidavits from of them in which they described, under oath, the torture that they had received: This is an unusually explicit and comprehensive tes- timony, probably unique in its detail about what's going on in a torture chamber.

This page report of the prisoners' sworn testi- mony was sneaked out of prison, along with a videotape which was taken showing people tes- tifying in prison about their torture.

The national press refused to cover it. The TV stations refused to run it. No one else would touch it. This was a time when there was more than a few "light-headed and cold-blooded Western intellectuals" who were singing the praises of Jose Napoleon Duarte and of Ronald Reagan. Anaya was not the subject of any tributes. He didn't get on Human Rights Day. He wasn't appointed to anything. He was released in a prisoner exchange and then assassinated, apparently by the U. Very little infor- mation about that ever appeared.

The media never asked whether exposure of the atroci- ties — instead of sitting on them and silencing them — might have saved his life. This tells you something about the way a well-functioning system of consent manufac- turing works. In comparison with the revela- tions of Herbert Anaya in El Salvador, Valladares's memoirs are not even a pea next to the mountain.

But you've got your job to do. That takes us toward the next war. I expect, we're going to hear more and more of this, until the next operation takes place. A few remarks about the last one.

Let's turn finally to that. Let me begin with this Uni- versity of Massachusetts study that I men- tioned before. It has some interesting conclusions. In the study people were asked whether they thought that the United States should intervene with force to reverse illegal occupation or serious human rights abuses.

By about two to one, people in the United States thought we should. We should use force in the case of illegal occupation of land and severe human rights abuses. These are all cases of illegal occupation and aggression and severe human rights abuses.

If you know the facts about that range of examples, you'll know very well that Saddam Hussein's aggression and atrocities fall well within the range. They're not the most extreme. Why doesn't anybody come to that conclusion? The reason is that nobody knows.

In a well-functioning propa- ganda system, nobody would know what I'm talking about when I list that range of exam- ples. If you bother to look, you find that those examples are quite appropriate. Take one that was ominously close to being perceived during the Gulf War. In February, right in the middle of the bombing campaign, the government of Lebanon requested Israel to observe U.

Security Council Resolution , which called on it to withdraw immedi- ately and unconditionally from Lebanon. That resolution dates from March There have since been two subsequent resolutions calling for the immediate and unconditional with- drawal of Israel from Lebanon. Of course it doesn't observe them because the United States backs it in maintaining that occupation.

Meanwhile southern Lebanon is terrorized. There are big torture-chambers with horrifying things going on. It's used as a base for attack- ing other parts of Lebanon. Since , Lebanon was invaded, the city of Beirut was bombed, about 20, people were killed, about 80 percent of them civilians, hospitals were destroyed, and more terror, looting, and robbery was inflicted.

All fine, the United States backed it. That's just one case. You didn't see anything in the media about it or any discus- sion about whether Israel and the United States should observe U.

Security Council Resolu- tion or any of the other resolutions, nor did anyone call for the bombing of Tel Aviv, although by the principles upheld by two-thirds of the population, we should. After all, that's illegal occupation and severe human rights abuses. There are much worse ones. The Indonesian invasion of East Timor knocked off about , people. They all look minor by that one.

That was strongly backed by the United States and is still going on with major United States diplomatic and military support. We can go on and on. People can believe that when we use force against Iraq and Kuwait it's because we really observe the principle that illegal occupation and human rights abuses should be met by force. They don't see what it would mean if those principles were applied to U. That's a success of propaganda of quite a spectacular type.

Let's take a look at another case. If you look closely at the coverage of the war since August , you'll notice that there are a couple of striking voices missing. For example, there is an Iraqi democratic opposition, in fact, a very courageous and quite substantial Iraqi democ- ratic opposition. They, of course, function in exile because they couldn't survive in Iraq. They are in Europe primarily. They are bankers, engineers, architects — people like that. They are articulate, they have voices, and they speak.

The previous February, when Sad- dam Hussein was still George Bush's favorite friend and trading partner, they actually came to Washington, according to Iraqi democratic opposition sources, with a plea for some kind of support for a demand of theirs calling for a parliamentary democracy in Iraq.

They were totally rebuffed, because the United States had no interest in it. There was no reaction to this in the public record. Since August it became a little harder to ignore their existence. In August we suddenly turned against Saddam Hussein after having favored him for many years.

Here was an Iraqi democratic opposition who ought to have some thoughts about the matter. They would be happy to see Saddam Hussein drawn and quar- tered. He killed their brothers, tortured their sisters, and drove them out of the country. They have been fighting against his tyranny throughout the whole time that Ronald Reagan and George Bush were cherishing him.

What about their voices? Take a look at the national media and see how much you can find about the Iraqi democratic opposition from August through March You can't find a word. It's not that they're inarticulate. They have statements, proposals, calls and demands. If you look at them, you find that they're indis- tinguishable from those of the American peace movement. They're against Saddam Hussein and they're against the war against Iraq.

They don't want their country destroyed. What they want is a peaceful resolution, and they knew perfectly well that it might have been achiev- able. That's the wrong view and therefore they're out. We don't hear a word about the Iraqi democratic opposition. If you want to find out about them, pick up the German press, or the British press. They don't say much about them, but they're less controlled than we are and they say something.

This is a spectacular achievement of pro- paganda. First, that the voices of the Iraqi democrats are completely excluded, and sec- ond, that nobody notices it. That's interesting, too. It takes a really deeply indoctrinated pop- ulation not to notice that we're not hearing the voices of the Iraqi democratic opposition and not asking the question, Why?

Let's take the question of the reasons for the war. Reasons were offered for the war. The reasons are: There was basically no other reason advanced. Can that possibly be the reason for the war? Does the United States uphold those principles, that aggressors cannot be rewarded and that aggression must be reversed by a quick resort to violence?

I won't insult your intelligence by running through the facts, but the fact is those arguments could be refuted in two minutes by a literate teenager. However, they never were refuted. Take a look at the media, the liberal commentators and critics, the people who testified in Congress and see whether anybody questioned the assumption that the United States stands up to those principles.

Has the United States opposed its own aggression in Panama and insisted on bombing Washington to reverse it? When the South African occupa- tion of Namibia was declared illegal in , did the United States impose sanctions on food and medicine? Did it go to war? Did it bomb Capetown? No, it carried out twenty years of "quiet diplomacy.

In the years of the Rea- gan-Bush administration alone, about 1. Forget what was happening in South Africa and Namibia. Some- how that didn't sear our sensitive souls.

We continued with "quite diplomacy" and ended up with ample reward for the aggressors. They were given the major port in Namibia and plenty of advantages that took into account their security concerns.

Where is this princi- ple that we uphold? Again, it's child's play to demonstrate that those couldn't possibly have been the reasons for going to war, because we don't uphold these principles. But nobody did it — that's what's important.

And nobody both- ered to point out the conclusion that follows: No reason was given for going to war. No reason was given for going to war that could not be refuted by a literate teenager in about two minutes. That again is the hallmark of a totalitarian culture.

It ought to frighten us, that we are so deeply totalitarian that we can be dri- ven to war without any reason being given for it and without anybody noticing Lebanon's request or caring.

It's a very striking fact. People were asked, If Iraq would agree to withdraw from Kuwait in return for Security Council consid- eration of the problem of Arab-Israeli conflict, would you be in favor of that? By about two-to- one, the population was in favor of that. So was the whole world, including the Iraqi democra- tic opposition. So it was reported that two- thirds of the American population were in favor of that.

Presumably, the people who were in favor of that thought they were the only ones in the world to think so. Certainly nobody in the press had said that it would be a good idea. The orders from Washington have been, we're supposed to be against "linkage," that is, diplomacy, and therefore everybody goose- stepped on command and everybody was against diplomacy.

Try to find commentary in the press — you can find a column by Alex Cock- burn in the Los Angeles Times, who argued that it would be a good idea. The people who were answering that question thought, I'm alone, but that's what I think. Suppose they knew that they weren't alone, that other people thought it, like the Iraqi democratic opposition.

Suppose that they knew that this was not hypothetical, that in fact Iraq had made exactly such an offer. It had been released by high U. On January 2, these officials had released an Iraqi offer to withdraw totally from Kuwait in return for consideration by the Security Council of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the problem of weapons of mass destruction. The United States had been refusing to negoti- ate this issue since well before the invasion of Kuwait.

Suppose that people had known that the offer was actually on the table and that it was widely supported and that in fact it's exactly the kind of thing that any rational per- son would do if they were interested in peace, as we do in other cases, in the rare cases that we do want to reverse aggression.

Suppose that it had been known. You can make your own guesses, but I would assume that the two-thirds would probably have risen to 98 percent of the population. Here you have the great successes of propaganda. Probably not one person who answered the poll knew any of the things I've just mentioned.

The people thought they were alone. Therefore it was possible to proceed with the war policy without opposition. There was a good deal of discussion about whether sanctions would work. You had the head of the CIA come up and discuss whether sanctions would work. However, there was no discussion of a much more obvious question: Had sanctions already worked? The answer is yes, apparently they had — probably by late August, very likely by late December. It was very hard to think up any other reason for the Iraqi offers of withdrawal, which were authen- ticated or in some cases released by high U.

Had sane- tions already worked? Was there a way out? Was there a way out in terms quite acceptable to the general population, the world at large and the Iraqi democratic opposition? These questions were not discussed, and it's crucial for a well-functioning propaganda system that they not be discussed. That enables the chair- man of the Republican National Committee to say that if any Democrat had been in office, Kuwait would not be liberated today. He can say that and no Democrat would get up and say that if I were president it would have been lib- erated not only today but six months ago, because there were opportunities then that I would have pursued and Kuwait would have been liberated without killing tens of thou- sands of people and without causing an envi- ronmental catastrophe.

No Democrat would say that because no Democrat took that posi- tion. Henry Gonzalez and Barbara Boxer took that position. But the number of people who took it is so marginal that it's virtually nonex- istent. Given the fact that almost no Democ- ratic politician would say that, Clayton Yeutter is free to make his statements. When Scud missiles hit Israel, nobody in the press applauded. Again, that's an interest- ing fact about a well-functioning propaganda system.

We might ask, why not? After all, Sad- dam Hussein's arguments were as good as George Bush's arguments. What were they, after all? Let's just take Lebanon. Saddam Hus- sein says that he can't stand annexation.

He can't stand annexation. He can't stand aggres- sion. Israel has been occupying southern Lebanon since in violation of Security Council resolutions that it refuses to abide by.

In the course of that period it attacked all of Lebanon, still bombs most of Lebanon at will. He can't stand it. His heart is bleeding. Sanctions can't work because the United States vetoes them. Negotiations won't work because the United States blocks them. What's left but force? He's been waiting for years. Thirteen years in the case of Lebanon, 20 years in the case of the West Bank. You've heard that argument before. The only difference between that argument and the one you heard is that Saddam Hussein could truly say sanctions and negotiations can't work because the United States blocks them.

But George Bush couldn't say that, because sanc- tions apparently had worked, and there was every reason to believe that negotiations could work — except that he adamantly refused to pursue them, saying explicitly, there will be no negotiations right through.

Did you find any- body in the press who pointed that out? It's a triviality. It's something that, again, a liter- ate teenager could figure out in a minute. But nobody pointed it out, no commentator, no edi- torial writer.

That, again, is the sign of a very well-run totalitarian culture. It shows that the manufacture of consent is working. Last comment about this. We could give many examples, you could make them up as you go along. Take the idea that Saddam Hus- sein is a monster about to conquer the world — widely believed, in the United States, and not unrealistically.

It was drilled into people's heads over and over again: He's about to take everything. We've got to stop him now. How did he get that powerful? This is a small, third- world country without an industrial base. For eight years Iraq had been fighting Iran. That's post-revolutionary Iran, which had decimated its officer corps and most of its military force. Iraq had a little bit of support in that war.

It couldn't defeat Iran. But all of a sudden it's ready to conquer the world. Did you find anybody who pointed that out? The fact of the matter is, this was a third-world country with a peasant army. It is now being conceded that there was a ton of disinforma- tion about the fortifications, the chemical weapons, etc.

But did you find anybody who pointedit out? You found virtually nobody who pointed it out. That's typical. Notice that this was done one year after exactly the same thing was done with Manuel Noriega. In com- parison with them, Manuel Noriega is a pretty minor thug.

Bad, but not a world-class thug of the kind we like. He was turned into a creature larger than life. He was going to destroy us, leading the narco-traffickers. We had to quickly move in and smash him, killing a cou- ple hundred or maybe thousand people, restor- ing to power the tiny, maybe eight percent white oligarchy, and putting U.

We had to do all those things because, after all, we had to save ourselves or we were going to be destroyed by this monster. One year later the same thing was done by Sad- dam Hussein. Did anybody point it out? Did anybody point out what had happened or why? You'll have to look pretty hard for that. Notice that this is not all that different from what the Creel Commission when it turned a pacifistic population into raving hys- terics who wanted to destroy everything Ger- man to save ourselves from Huns who were tearing the arms off Belgian babies.

The tech- niques are maybe more sophisticated, with television and lots of money going into it, but it's pretty traditional. I think the issue, to come back to my orig- inal comment, is not simply disinformation and the Gulf crisis. What they interact with and relate to is other major power centers—the government, other corporations, or the universities.

Because the media are a doctrinal system they interact closely with the universities. Say you are a reporter writing a story on Southeast Asia or Africa, or something like that.

These outside institutions are very similar to the media. The universities, for example, are not independent institutions. There may be independent people scattered around in them but that is true of the media as well. But the institution itself is parasitic.

There are all sorts of filtering devices to get rid of people who are a pain in the neck and think independently. The elite institutions like, say, Harvard and Princeton and the small upscale colleges, for example, are very much geared to socialization.

If you go through a place like Harvard, most of what goes on there is teaching manners; how to behave like a member of the upper classes, how to think the right thoughts, and so on.

It was a big hit. Everybody loved it. Turns out he wrote an introduction to Animal Farm which was suppressed. It only appeared 30 years later. Someone had found it in his papers. But he said England is not all that different. People who have independent ideas or who think the wrong kind of thoughts are cut out. He talks a little, only two sentences, about the institutional structure. He asks, why does this happen? Well, one, because the press is owned by wealthy people who only want certain things to reach the public.

Those two sentences more or less tell the story. When you critique the media and you say, look, here is what Anthony Lewis or somebody else is writing, they get very angry. I write anything I like. If they had started off at the Metro desk, or something, and had pursued the wrong kind of stories, they never would have made it to the positions where they can now say anything they like.

The same is mostly true of university faculty in the more ideological disciplines. They have been through the socialization system. Okay, you look at the structure of that whole system. What do you expect the news to be like? Take the New York Times. The product is audiences. They are happy to put it on the worldwide web for free. They actually lose money when you buy the newspaper. But the audience is the product. The product is privileged people, just like the people who are writing the newspapers, you know, top-level decision-making people in society.

You have to sell a product to a market, and the market is, of course, advertisers that is, other businesses. Whether it is television or newspapers, or whatever, they are selling audiences.

Corporations sell audiences to other corporations. Well, what do you expect to happen? What would you predict about the nature of the media product, given that set of circumstances? Okay, then comes the hard work. You ask, does it work the way you predict?

Well, you can judge for yourselves. The next thing you discover is that this whole topic is completely taboo. If you go to the Kennedy School of Government or Stanford, or somewhere, and you study journalism and communications or academic political science, and so on, these questions are not likely to appear.

That is, the hypothesis that anyone would come across without even knowing anything that is not allowed to be expressed, and the evidence bearing on it cannot be discussed.

The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda

Well, you predict that too. Why should they allow critical analysis of what they are up to take place? Again, it is not purposeful censorship. That includes the left what is called the left , as well as the right. So you have a second order of prediction which is that the first order of prediction is not allowed into the discussion. The last thing to look at is the doctrinal framework in which this proceeds. Do people at high levels in the information system, including the media and advertising and academic political science and so on, do these people have a picture of what ought to happen when they are writing for each other not when they are making graduation speeches?

When you make a commencement speech, it is pretty words and stuff. But when they are writing for one another, what do people say about it? There are basically three currents to look at. One is the public relations industry, you know, the main business propaganda industry.

So what are the leaders of the PR industry saying? What do they say? The people who write impressive books about the nature of democracy and that sort of business. The third thing you look at is the academic stream, particularly that part of political science which is concerned with communications and information and that stuff which has been a branch of political science for the last 70 or 80 years.

So, look at those three things and see what they say, and look at the leading figures who have written about this. But then they are supposed to go home and do something else like watch football or whatever it may be.

The answer is pretty obvious. They are terrible judges of their own interests so we have do it for them for their own benefit. Actually, it is very similar to Leninism. We do things for you and we are doing it in the interest of everyone, and so on.

You take the same position. It has an interesting history. A lot of it comes out of the first World War, which is a big turning point. It changed the position of the United States in the world considerably. In the 18th century the U.

The quality of life, health, and longevity was not achieved by the upper classes in Britain until the early 20th century, let alone anybody else in the world. The U. But it was not a big player on the world scene. During the first World War, the relations changed. And they changed more dramatically during the second World War. After the second World War the U. But after first World War there was already a change and the U. That was one change, but there were other changes.

The first World War was the first time there was highly organized state propaganda. The British had a Ministry of Information, and they really needed it because they had to get the U. They were targeting American intellectuals on the reasonable assumption that these are the people who are most gullible and most likely to believe propaganda.

They are also the ones that disseminate it through their own system. So it was mostly geared to American intellectuals and it worked very well. The British Ministry of Information documents a lot have been released show their goal was, as they put it, to control the thought of the entire world, a minor goal, but mainly the U. This Ministry of Information was extremely successful in deluding hot shot American intellectuals into accepting British propaganda fabrications. They were very proud of that.

Properly so, it saved their lives. They would have lost the first World War otherwise. In the U. Woodrow Wilson was elected in on an anti-war platform.

It has always been. The country was very much opposed to the first World War and Wilson was, in fact, elected on an anti-war position.Here was an Iraqi democratic opposition who ought to have some thoughts about the matter. Over the last ten years, every year or two, some major monster is constructed that we have to defend ourselves against.

In August we suddenly turned against Saddam Hussein after having favored him for many years. It takes a really deeply indoctrinated pop- ulation not to notice that we're not hearing the voices of the Iraqi democratic opposition and not asking the question, Why?

C The unstated premise — and even the responsible men have to dis- guise this from themselves — has to do with the question of how they get into the position where they have the authority to make deci- sions. Following from the propaganda technique 3, one way the government crushes strikers, unions, and organizations is by manufacturing monsters: We want to be together and have things like harmony and Americanism and working together.