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THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PDF

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The Theory of International Politics. Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition. pdf. WALTZ () - Theory of International Politics. Pages Theory of International Politics KENNETH N. WALTZ University of Califo rnia, Berkeley. Kenneth Waltz - Theory of International Politics - Free download as PDF File .pdf ), Text File .txt) or read online for free.


Theory Of International Politics Pdf

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THE application of game theory to international politics is hardly new, but there has been a recent increase in the popularity of the approach. This resurgence. introduction to the field of International Relations theory. In 20 short paperback and, uniquely for textbooks, also freely accessible in web and PDF formats. PDF | Acknowledgements 1. Four sociologies of international politics Part I. Social Theory: 2. Scientific realism and social kinds 3. 'Ideas all the.

They do not wish to lose their freedom, and in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared to defend themselves 5. They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust 5. They are pious, believing that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them 5.

Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of aggression is unjust.

What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand or by prudent calculations. The Athenian argument is based on key realist concepts such as security and power, and is informed not by what the world should be, but by what it is.

The Athenians disregard any moral talk and urge the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize their military inferiority, to consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about their own survival 5. There appears to be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their position, based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination, their logic proves to be seriously flawed.

Melos, a relatively weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. The eventual destruction of Melos does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will lose a few years later. In the History, Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power.

There are no logical limits to the size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and gain, after conquering Melos, the Athenians engage in a war against Sicily. They pay no attention to the Melian argument that considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run 5. And, as the Athenians overestimate their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves to be very shortsighted indeed. It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely on power alone.

Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the cynicism of their Athenian opponents. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there were some universal moral values on which political life could be based.

Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic and international politics.

His ideas concerning righteousness in war were carried further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Machiavelli — challenged this well-established moral tradition, thus positioning himself as a political innovator.

The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his separation of politics from ethics.

He thereby lays the foundations for modern politics. It represents the sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to both domestic and international affairs.

It is a doctrine which denies the relevance of morality in politics, and claims that all means moral and immoral are justified to achieve certain political ends. He operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes, and to apply it to international relations.

Thus he overturned the traditional morality. Referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state was power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers, and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power.

He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar as it was expedient for the state. The idea of an autonomous ethics of state behavior and the concept of realpolitik were thus introduced. These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with which German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified their policies of conquest and extermination.

Machiavelli is often praised for his prudential advice to leaders which has caused him to be regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy and for his defense of the republican form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such praise.

Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for the demoralization of Europe. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainstream of Western political thought. It was the force and timeliness of his justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political ends that persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him.

The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other to the bitter end without regard for the rules of justice.

The tension between expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a double ethics, private and public, that created a further damage to traditional, customary ethics was invented. Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is.

According to classical political philosophy, on which the idealist perspective is based, human beings can control their desires through reason and can work for the benefit of others, even at the expense of their own benefit.

They are thus both rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social. With great skill Hobbes attacks these views. They therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such ideas, Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist tradition in international relations, and especially to neorealism.

These include the characterization of human nature as egoistic, the concept of international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the struggle for power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically. He derives his notion of the state of war from his views of both human nature and the condition in which individuals exist. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter such force with force.

Being suspicious of one another and driven by fear, they are also likely to engage in preemptive actions and invade one another to ensure their own safety. Finally, individuals are also driven by pride and a desire for glory. Hobbes is primarily concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and his comments about relations among states are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says about the lives of individuals in the state of nature can also be interpreted as a description of how states exist in relation to one another.

Realism (international relations)

Accordingly, the quest and struggle for power lies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among states. The same would later be true of the model of international relations developed by Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted the same view of human nature.

By subjecting themselves to a sovereign, individuals escape the war of all against all which Hobbes associates with the state of nature; however, this war continues to dominate relations among states.

This does not mean that states are always fighting, but rather that they have a disposition to fight XIII 8. With each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time.

The achievement of domestic security through the creation of a state is then paralleled by a condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape this condition, states should also enter into a contract and submit themselves to a world sovereign. He does not propose that a social contract among nations be implemented to bring international anarchy to an end.

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This is because the condition of insecurity in which states are placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity for their citizens. As long as an armed conflict or other type of hostility between states does not actually break out, individuals within a state can feel relatively secure.

His theory of international relations, which assumes that independent states, like independent individuals, are enemies by nature, asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral limitation on their behavior, is a great challenge to the idealist political vision based on human sociability and to the concept of the international jurisprudence that is built on this vision.

However, what separates Hobbes from Machiavelli and associates him more with classical realism is his insistence on the defensive character of foreign policy.

His political theory does not put forward the invitation to do whatever may be advantageous for the state. His approach to international relations is prudential and pacific: sovereign states, like individuals, should be disposed towards peace which is commended by reason. By suggesting that certain dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature, he affirms that more peaceful and cooperative international relations are possible. Neither does he deny the existence of international law.

Sovereign states can sign treaties with one another to provide a legal basis for their relations. At the same time, however, Hobbes seems aware that international rules will often prove ineffective in restraining the struggle for power. States will interpret them to their own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of the states affected. Hence, international relations will always tend to be a precarious affair.

Twentieth Century Classical Realism Twentieth-century realism was born in response to the idealist perspective that dominated international relations scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War. The idealists of the s and s also called liberal internationalists or utopians had the goal of building peace in order to prevent another world conflict.

They saw the solution to inter-state problems as being the creation of a respected system of international law, backed by international organizations. This interwar idealism resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of outlawing war and providing for the peaceful settlements of disputes. Fosdick, and other prominent idealists of the era, gave their intellectual support to the League of Nations. Instead of focusing on what some might see as the inevitability of conflict between states and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common interests that could unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and morality.

For them, war did not originate in an egoistic human nature, but rather in imperfect social conditions and political arrangements, which could be improved. Yet their ideas were already being criticized in the early s by Reinhold Niebuhr and within a few years by E.

This fact, perhaps more than any theoretical argument, produced a strong realist reaction. Then, during the s and s, classical realism came under challenge of scholars who tried to introduce a more scientific approach to the study of international politics. During the s it gave way to another trend in international relations theory—neorealism.

Since it is impossible within the scope of this article to introduce all of the thinkers who contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, as perhaps the most influential among them, have been selected for discussion here.

Carr challenges idealism by questioning its claim to moral universalism and its idea of the harmony of interests. Carr uses the concept of the relativity of thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern theorists, to show that standards by which policies are judged are the products of circumstances and interests. His central idea is that the interests of a given party always determine what this party regards as moral principles, and hence, these principles are not universal.

Carr observes that politicians, for example, often use the language of justice to cloak the particular interests of their own countries, or to create negative images of other people to justify acts of aggression.

Policies are not, as the idealists would have it, based on some universal norms, independent of interests of the parties involved. While the idealists tend to regard such values, such as peace or justice, as universal and claim that upholding them is in the interest of all, Carr argues against this view. According to him, there are neither universal values nor universal interests. He claims that those who refer to universal interests are in fact acting in their own interests They think that what is best for them is best for everyone, and identify their own interests with the universal interest of the world at large.

The idealist concept of the harmony of interests is based on the notion that human beings can rationally recognize that they have some interests in common, and that cooperation is therefore possible.

Carr contrasts this idea with the reality of conflict of interests. According to him, the world is torn apart by the particular interests of different individuals and groups.

In such a conflictual environment, order is based on power, not on morality. Further, morality itself is the product of power Like Hobbes, Carr regards morality as constructed by the particular legal system that is enforced by a coercive power. International moral norms are imposed on other countries by dominant nations or groups of nations that present themselves as the international community as a whole. Values that idealists view as good for all, such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and international order, are regarded by Carr as mere status quo notions.

The powers that are satisfied with the status quo regard the arrangement in place as just and therefore preach peace. They try to rally everyone around their idea of what is good. On the other hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement as unjust, and so prepare for war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it cannot be simply enforced, is to satisfy the unsatisfied powers.

Carr was a sophisticated thinker. Thus, he acknowledges that human beings need certain fundamental, universally acknowledged norms and values, and contradicts his own argument by which he tries to deny universality to any norms or values. To make further objections, the fact that the language of universal moral values can be misused in politics for the benefit of one party or another, and that such values can only be imperfectly implemented in political institutions, does not mean that such values do not exist.

There is a deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for peace, order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the constant attempt to reflect upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in their attempt they do not pay enough attention to the reality of power.

On the other hand, in the world of pure realism, in which all values are made relative to interests, life turns into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable. While we can fault the interwar idealists for their inability to construct international institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, this book indicates that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the challenge.

Carr frequently refers to Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a country like any other. Kant is most prominently used today in the explanation of the Democratic Peace and in the justification of liberal foreign policies. MacMillan argues that a more inclusive reading of Kant, in particular attention to the preliminary articles of Perpetual Peace, contradicts the Democratic Peace interpretation and it recovers the critical potential of Kant for judging contemporary international politics.

Here, it is argued that the attempt to reform international law and to accord unequal rights of sovereignty and non-intervention to liberal and nonliberal states can only be supported with reference to Kant on the basis of a highly selective reading.

In Kantian terms, however, private judgment is a characteristic of the state of nature rather than a route to increased legalization. Yuichi Aiko, in Chapter 5, demonstrates the importance of the contemporaneous intellectual debates for the interpretation of Rousseau.

Aiko shows, however, that the intellectual debate to which Saint-Pierre and Rousseau contributed was concerned with natural law. All four chapters respectively recover the rhetorical and theoretical context and the contemporaneous intellectual debates of Thucydides, Kant and Rousseau.

The reconstruction of this intellectual context demonstrates in each case that contemporary distinctions between domestic and international politics do not apply to the classical texts.

Consequently, the integration of these spheres of social and political life in the classical texts leads in all four cases to a reintegration of morality and power. If Thucydides and Rousseau integrate the domestic and the international as well as being crucially concerned with the mutually constitutive nature of power and morality, the question arises on what grounds they may be incorporated into the contemporary Realist school of thought.

Most importantly, all four chapters contribute 19 Classical Theory in International Relations constructively to contemporary political and theoretical issues. MacMillan and Franceschet, on the basis of their Kant interpretation, explicitly and critically challenge contemporary theory and practice of liberal foreign policies while simultaneously indicating more promising avenues for such policies.

The chapters in the second part focus on the investigation of the political context of classical texts. Blaney and Inayatullah thus disrupt the substantive narrative of International Political Economy and the definition of the discipline by introducing an ethnological context. They also demonstrate that such a contextual reading of Smith recovers an ethical dimension which allows for a critical judgment of contemporary capitalism. This theme is also taken up by David Boucher in Chapter 7.

Despite this international political background, Locke is generally seen as a domestic political theorist and hence widely ignored in International Relations. Boucher shows that with Locke himself, International Relations excludes the centrality of theories of property for the constitution of the modern international order.

The chapter, thus, challenges the disciplinary divide between Political Theory and International Relations as well as providing the basis for a constructive investigation into the role of property in the constitution of contemporary international relations. Liberal capitalist states and their foreign policies, however, have been theorized by John Stuart Mill, whose writings are widely neglected in contemporary International Relations or so selectively appropriated that his justification of imperialism — which perfectly mirrors contemporary liberal thought — is not discussed at all.

The contributions to this part recover the political context of classical texts for the purpose of illuminating generally neglected dimensions of contemporary international relations. Contemporary assumptions and disciplinary divides have led to the marginalization of Smith, Locke and Mill in the pantheon of classical authors with which the discipline engages. The common themes of these authors, interestingly, all turn out to revolve around issues of property and political and economic inequality in the international system — in other words, around colonialism and imperialism.

The relationship between European states and Amerindians or non-Europeans more generally played a constitutive role in the development of the modern international system as well as international theory.

Despite variations on this theme over time, the historical continuity of those conceptions as well as of their exclusion from explicit reflection constitutes a serious challenge to the discipline of International Relations. By reconstructing the political context in which these theories have first been developed, all three chapters open up the possibility of a constructive engagement with contemporary political and economic inequality. And both subsumed this actual multilinear — or international — starting point under a unilinear universalizing philosophy of history in order to retain the possibility of Germany catching up with its more advanced neighbour.

Moreover, this reinterpretation also challenges poststructural and postcolonial positions. Edward Keene, in Chapter 10, reconstructs the way in which Grotius has turned from a jurisprudential theorist to a political philosopher of international society in contemporary International Relations. The roots of the latter interpretation, argues Keene, lie in the European reactions to the French Revolution.

In this context, Grotius was read as having anticipated the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and legal equality of states which gradually developed into the modern states-system. On the one hand, it marginalizes a whole body of jurisprudential thought which could provide a much more varied and rich picture of the — not always so natural, gradual and inevitable — development of the modern states-system.

The focus on the Westphalian system, on the other hand, displaces alternative dimensions of political thought and practice like republicanism and imperialism — leaving the contemporary discipline firmly in the grasp of the ideological origins of the conventional understanding of Grotius.

In accordance with these authors, Williams develops an interpretation of Hobbes which stands in contradiction to the dominant Realist readings of this author either as a rational choice theorist or as a theorist of international society. The exploration of this neglected lineage does not only turn up an alternative interpretation of Hobbes; it also allows for a better understanding of contemporary neoconservatism which owes a lot in particular to Leo Strauss. Finally, in Chapter 12, Julian Reid introduces a neglected lineage of the interpretation of Clausewitz.

Clausewitz has been central to International Relations as a strategic thinker. Reid shows, however, that Clausewitz plays an equally important role in the development of modern counter-strategic thought. By investigating the historical and political context of the lineages of classical thought, the chapters in this part demonstrate the limitations and historical burdens International Relations has unconsciously taken on.

Among these are the universalizing ethical responses of Kant and Hegel to the French Revolution and the counter-revolutionary conception of sovereignty produced by nineteenth-century interpretations of Grotius. In both cases, the inclusion of these particular conceptions simultaneously implies the exclusion of alternatives — either in the form of an ethical position towards difference or in the form of more varied legal, historical and political discourses reflecting and shaping European development.

Similar results are also achieved by focusing on lineages outside the discipline of International Relations. Hence, the analysis of lineages of classical thought opens up the possibility of alternative interpretations of Grotius, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel and Clausewitz and of the inclusion of hitherto neglected authors. More importantly, however, it squarely puts such core concepts as sovereignty, difference and war back on the agenda and points towards the possibility of their radical reinterpretation.

And such reinterpretation clearly entails the potential to transform the nature and definition of the discipline itself. This collection of interpretations of classical authors based on the analysis of their intellectual and political context as well as on the trajectories of their appropriation in the discipline aims to demonstrate the rich potential of classical texts for the study of international relations.

And this potential lies in three different but interrelated areas. Firstly, the analyses presented here all contribute to a broader conception of the discipline itself based on the recovery of the predisciplinary intellectual context of classical thought. They show that — and how — political, economic, ethnological, philosophical, sociological, normative and legal dimensions are constitutive of international thought and practice even in the present-day world.

Finally, the contextual interpretations throw a new and different light on such core concepts and issues of contemporary international thought and practice as sovereignty, morality, law, property, imperialism and agency, and thus provide the basis for further constructive research into these areas.

We are excited by the keen analysis, the apparent accessibility of the actors to rational interpretation, the ring of familiarity in the events the historian recounts. As good counsel, a theory, an example to avoid if so, how? Having treated Thucydides as a forerunner of modern realism,2 International Relations scholars today better appreciate the complexity of his text and often challenge the Realist reading.

Extensive revisions explain the change in title. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Antithesis in the form of paired speeches e. Cleon and Diodotus and dramatic juxtapositions e. But the presence of antithesis in the treatment of Pericles, a part of the text usually thought to exhibit a more straightforward teaching, has commanded less attention. Although Thucydides presents Pericles as singularly praiseworthy e.

The fuller, more subtle treatment of Pericles as it emerges from the text as a whole, suggests tension between two antithetical yet complementary attitudes regarding the possibility of conducting ourselves wisely. The second is a conviction that moral norms must be buttressed by the effective application of coercive power. But in the ensuing narrative he reveals them to be social and intellectual constructs, which the protagonists of the drama, through ambition, fear and conceit, proceed to dash or erode.

Awareness of the importance of antithesis helps us not only appreciate his style but understand his political philosophy. Antithesis, when wielded with the skill and relentlessness of Thucydides, nourishes scepticism, doubt regarding anything and everything that one may have previously accepted as knowledge, wisdom or truth. This is 10 See, e. The text thus invites us to believe that good politics must be Periclean politics.

Among the virtues displayed by Pericles are his skills as a military leader I. Moreover, he is a master of the art of persuasion. He draws on his oratorical skills to stoke Athenian patriotism and self-confidence II. Nevertheless, we detect in the History as a whole a subtle interrogation of this glowing appraisal. While opposing the people on difficult occasions, Pericles unwaveringly supports their desire for empire; while extolling Athenian virtues, he undermines the norms of social cohesion; while advocating a prudent course of action, he engages Athens in an adventure that produces momentous turns of fortune.

Thucydides unquestionably attributes to Pericles a unique ability to persuade citizens to adopt a strategy that involves hardship and self-discipline, and to speak frankly to the Assembly to the point of 13 F. And indeed Thucydides explicitly distinguishes Pericles from all subsequent leaders precisely on this point. But although Pericles is quite unlike the crop of leaders that succeed him, he does not differ from his successors as regards his attachment to empire.

During his leadership, the Athenians boldly transfer the treasury of the Delian League from Delos to Athens and use it to finance the adornment of the city. As crisis unfolds, Pericles positions himself as the leader most capable of protecting the empire. He does not rule out enlarging it once the crisis has passed. Many have tried to explain international-political events in terms of psychological factors or social-psychological phenomena or national political Among the depressing features of international-political studies is the small gain and economic characteristics.

In at least some of these cases, the possibly ger- in explanatory power that has come from the large amount of work done in mane factors are explained by theories of somewhat more power than theories of recent decades. Nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism.

Instead, the international politics have been able to generate. In no case, however, are those same sorts of summary and superficial criticisms are made over and over again, nonpolitical theories strong enough to provide reliable explanations or predic- and the same sorts of errors are repeated. Rather than add to the number of sur- tions. Doing so will incline our thoughts urge to reduce has been prominent. This urge can be further explaIned by adding more toward the possibilities and limitations of different types of theory and less a practical reason to the theoretical reason just given.

It must often seem that toward the strengths and weaknesses of particular theorists. How can explanations at the international-political level rival in importance a major power's answers to such questions as these: Should it spend more or less on I defense? Should it make nuclear weapons or not? Should it stand fast and fight or retreat and seek peace? National decisions and activities seem to be of over- Theories of international politics can be sorted out in a number of ways.

Else- whelming importance. This practical condition, together with the failure of where I have distinguished explanations of international politics, and especially international-political theories to provide either convincing explanations or ser- efforts to locate the causes of war and to define the conditions of peace, according viceable guidance for research, has provided adequate temptation to pursue to the level at which causes are located-whether in man, the state, or the state reductionist approaches.

A still simpler division may be made, one that separates The economic theory of imperialism developed by Hobson and Lenin is the theories according to whether they are reductionist or systemic. Theories of inter- best of such approaches. The theory is elegant and powerful. Simply stated and reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the intemationallevel incorporating only a few elements, it claims to explain the most important of as well are systemic.

In Chapter 2, I shall focus on reductionist theories.

The effort to explain the behavior of a prevail. The theory offers explanations and, unlike most theories in the social group through psychological study of its members is a reductionist approach, as is the effort to understand international politics by studying national bureaucrats and bureaucracies.

Essential to compatible. This chapter examines approaches to international politics that are both political and systemic. What is a systems approach? One way to answer the question is to compare analytic with systemic approaches. The analytic method, preeminently the method of classical physics and because of its immense success often thought of as the method of science, requires reducing the entity to its dis- Skepticism about the adequacy of reductionist theories does not tell us what sort crete parts and examining their properties and connections.

The whole is under- of systems theory might serve better. Explaining international politics in nonpo- stood by studying its elements in their relative simplicity and by observing the litical terms does not require reducing international to national politics.

One must relations between them. By controlled experiments, the relation between each carefully distinguish between reduction from system to unit level and explanation pair of variables is separately examined.

After similarly examining other pairs, of political outcomes, whether national or international, by reference to some the factors are combined in an equation in which they appear as variables in the other system. Karl Marx tried to explain the politics of nations by their eco- statement of a causal law. The elements, disjoined and understood in their sim- nomics. Immanuel Wallerstein tries to explain national and international politics plicity, are combined or aggregated to remake the whole, with times and masses by the effects "the capitalist world-economy" has on them September One added as scalars and the relations among their distances and forces added accord- useful point is thereby suggested, although it is a point that Wallerstein strongly ing to the vector laws of addition see, e.

The interstate system is not the only international system that one may This is the analytic method. It works, and works wonderfully, where rela- conceive of. Wallerstein shows in many interesting ways how the world eco- tions among several factors can be resolved into relations between pairs of vari- nomic system affects national and international politics. But claiming that eco- ables while "other things are held equal" and where the assumption can be made nomics affects politics is no denial of the claim that politics affects economics and that perturbing influences not included in the variables are small.

Because analy- that some political outcomes have political causes. Wallerstein argues that Jlin the tic procedure is simpler, it is preferred to a systems approach. But analysis is not nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world-system in exis- always sufficient. It will be sufficient only where systems-level effects are absent tence, the capitalist world-economy" p. The argument confuses theory or are weak enough to be ignored. It will be insufficient, and a systems approach with reality and identifies a model of a theory with the real world, errors identi- will be needed, if outcomes are affected not only by the properties and intercon- fied in Chapter 1.

An international-political theory serves primarily to explain nections of variables but also by the way in which they are organized. It also tells us something about the foreign poli- If the organization of units affects their behavior and their interactions, then cies of states and about their economic and other interactions. But saying that a one cannot predict outcomes or understand them merely by knowing the charac- theory about international economics tells us something about politics, and that a teristics, purposes, and interactions of the system's units.

The failure of the reduc- theory about international politics tells us something about economi. In telling us something tems approach is needed. Where similarity of outcomes prevails despite changes about living beings, chemistry does not displace biology. Something works as a constraint on the agents or is inter- structed?

Alan C. Isaak argues that political science has no theories and no theo- posed between them and the outcomes their actions contribute to. In interna- retical concepts , p.

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The preceding discussion may have strengthened tional politics, systems-level forces seem to be at work. Just as peacemakers. Reductionist and may fail to make peace, so troublemakers may fail to make trouble. From attri- butes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situations of the actors as well as on their attributes.

Systemic Theories Few, it seems, can consistently escape from the belief that intemational- political outcomes are determined, rather than merely' affected, by what states are like. Hobson's error has been made by almost everyone, at least from the nine- teenth century onward.

In the earlier history of modem great-power politics, all of the states were monarchies, and most of them absolute ones. Was the power- political game played because of international-political imperatives or simply because authoritarian states are power-minded? If the answer to the latter part of the question were "yes ," then profound national changes would transform inter- national politics.

Such changes began to take place in Europe and America most Chapters 2 and 3 are highly critical.

Criticism is a negative task that is supposed strikingly in For some, democracy became the form of the state that would to have positive payoffs. To gain them, I shall in this chapter first reflect on the make the world a peaceful one; for others, later, it was socialism that would turn theoretical defects revealed in previous pages and then say what a systems theory the trick. Not simply war and peace, moreover, but international politics in gen- of international politics comprises and what it can and cannot accomplish.

I Political scientists, whether traditional or modem in orientation, reify their systems by reducing them to their interacting parts. For two reasons, the lumping In one way or another, theories of international politics, whether reductionist or systemic, deal with events at all levels, from the subnational to the supranational.

First, the difference in the methods they use obscures the according to how they arrange their materials. Reductionist th"eories explain similarity of their methodology, that is, of the logic their inquiries follow. That internal forces produce external outcomes impression that the difference of methods is a difference of methodology. Tradi- is the claim of such theories.

Kenneth Waltz - Theory of International Politics

X is their pattern. The international sys- tionalists emphasize the structural distinction between domestic and international tem, if conceived of at all, is taken to be merely an outcome. The distinction turns on the A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts. Once the difference between politics conducted in a condition of settled rules and politics theory that explains the behavior of the parts is fashioned, no further effort is conducted in a condition of anarchy.

Raymond Aron, for example, finds the dis- required. According to the theories of imperialism examined in Chapter 2, for tinctive quality of international politics in lithe absence of a tribunal or police example, international outcomes are simply the sum of the results produced by force, the right to resort to force, the plurality of autonomous centers of decision, the separate states, and the behavior of each of them is explained through its the alternation and continual interplay between peace and war" , p.

Hobson's theory, taken as a general one, is a theory With this view, contrast J. David Singer's examination of the descriptive, about the workings of national economies.

Giyen certain conditions, it explains explanatory, and predictive potentialities of two different levels of analysis: In his examination, he fails even to mention employed.

From a knowledge of how capitalist economies work, Hobson the contextual difference between organized politics within states and formally believed he could infer the external behavior of capitalist states. He made the unorganized politics among them. If the contextual difference is overlooked or error of predicting outcomes from attributes. To try to do that amounts to over- denied, then the qualitative difference of internal and external politics disappears looking the difference between these two statements: And that is indeed the conclusion that modernists reach.

The differ- makes trouble. Perfect competition, complete collusion, 5 absolute control: These different causes produce identical results. From unifor- mity of outcomes one cannot infer that the attributes and the interactions of the parts of a system have remained constant. Structure may determine outcomes Political Structures aside from changes at the level of the units and aside from the disappearance of some of them and the emergence of others.

Different "causes" may produce the same effects; the same "causes" may have different consequences. Unless one knows how a realm is organized, one can hardly tell the causes from the effects.

The effect of an organization may predominate over the attributes and the interactions of the elements within it. A system that is independent of initial con- ditions is said to display equifinality.

If it does, lithe system is then its own best explanation, and the study of its present organization the appropriate meth- odology" Watzlawick, et al. Structure has to be studied in its own right as do units. To claim to be approaches mingle and confuse systems-level with unit-level causes.Morgenthau himself reinforces the belief in the human drive for power by introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality.

Since all states want to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in which each state has to take care of itself, there is no division of labor or functional differentiation among them.

The new debate between international neo realists and neo liberals is no longer concerned with the questions of morality and human nature, but with the extent to which state behavior is influenced by the anarchic structure of the international system rather than by institutions, learning and other factors that are conductive to cooperation.

In self-help systems, as we know competing parties consider relative gains more important than absolute ones. The onetime rage for reduction among biologists may have been unfor- tunate.