INDIAN AIR FORCE PDF
This AFO lays down the detailed procedure for grant of extension of engagement beyond the initial term of engagement as per para of Regulations for IAF. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is the air arm of the Indian Armed Forces. Its complement of "Strategic Role of Air Power" (PDF). Air Power Journal. Center for Air Power Studies. 3 (2): 27– Retrieved 8 April ^ "INDIAN AIR FORCE MUSEUM. AUSTRALIANairpower. Indian Air Force ramps up combat capability Peter Layton ' Over the next ten years we are likely to see the IAF deploy frequently across.
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Indian Air Force. Modernization Plan of. Challenges for. Regional Air Forces. Air Commodore Zia Ul Haque Shamsi,. Pakistan Air Force. October Indian Air Force invites ONLINE application from UNMARRIED MALE INDIAN CITIZENS (citizens of Nepal are also eligible) for selection test on. The Indian Air Force's capabilities are continuing to deteriorate, despite the arrival In IHS Jane's World Air Forces (JWAF) described the Indian Air Force.
In keeping with its mandate of enabling national development, the IAF also plays a significant role in aid to civil population during disasters, crisis etc. Notwithstanding the size of the country and the varied terrain, it deploys swiftly and frequently across the country for disaster mitigation and control. The IAF is frequently deployed for supply drops as also aerial evacuation during natural disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones, landslides, floods etc both within the country and even beyond.
The IAF has conducted numerous such operations as for instance: evacuating thousands of people during snowstorms in Jammu and Kashmir in ; airlifting of more than , Indian citizens from Iraq and Kuwait during Gulf War I in conjunction with Air India and Indian Airlines which are the other elements of Indian air power.
The IAF also serves the ends of democracy by periodically transporting paramilitary and civilian personnel for election duties. These are capable of launching within minutes to signal the resolve of the government of India for deterring any aerial misadventure.
All the above examples demonstrate that air power enables force projection, both benign and otherwise, to support national security objectives in more ways than one. The emphasis during the Cold War was on nuclear balance and strategic bombing was linked to this balance. This led to the development of nuclear bombers and high altitude interceptors. The large payloads carried by these aircraft and the unmatched rapidity with which they could deliver them made air power the instrument of choice.
Achieving air superiority quickly, proved crucial in the Arab-Israeli war for neutralising superior Arab capabilities. The Vietnam War highlighted the limitations of air power against low value low contrast target systems and the need for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences SEAD to reduce aircraft losses.
As air defences against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes improved, air forces around the world came to prefer the protection offered by a high-speed low-level ingress while operating in a densely hostile air defence environment.
In the s, the Air Land doctrine was enunciated by the US army.
It highlighted the significance of manoeuvre warfare and the synchronised application of air power to manipulate the battlefield for swift success in wars. In the Gulf War, once again medium and high attitude operations came back into favour to prevent aircraft losses to shoulder fired missiles and highly lethal low level air defences.
This was also validated during the Kargil conflict of In the Gulf war technology created a paradigm shift albeit selectively in the employment of air power. The enemy was treated as a target system and air power was used strategically to carry out parallel attacks on the enemys vital Centres of Gravity.
In Kosovo, air power was the only military instrument used to achieve coalition objectives. However, subsequent air campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq along with the Israeli experience against Hezbollah and other non-state actors have yielded mixed results.
The clear lesson is that while air power remains an instrument of choice, its effectiveness depends to a large extent upon the adversary, the kind of target systems that can be engaged through the medium of air, and the ability of military and political leadership to use it for maximum effect. The major post Cold War innovations included stealth, precision, extended reach, night sensors and enhanced computing power. Leadership now became a viable target. A significant shift also took place with the development of night fighting enabling technology that reduced the flexibility enjoyed earlier by surface forces to manoeuvre at night.
Further, space became closely integrated with warfare and was utilised for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR functions, secure communications, integrated early warning, weather forecasting and navigation.
Space based assets significantly enhanced the potency of air power. Due to increased battlefield transparency, it also became easier to discern enemy intentions.
Use of precision weapons at long range proved effective in causing a strategic paralysis. The media brought warfare into living rooms and therefore significantly influenced the way in which wars were conducted. It created international pressure and sensitivity regarding friendly losses and collateral damage. Whilst short duration of wars meant there was little time for the strategic effect to manifest itself, but the necessity of making a swift strategic impact, increased especially when operating under nuclear thresholds.
With technological advancement, air power provided the capabilities that linked tactical actions with strategic outcomes that could prove crucial, especially in short duration wars. While traditional threats have reduced, threats from nonstate actors have increased. From attrition oriented warfare, war waging concepts have rapidly moved towards Effects Based Operations, wherein functional paralysis is more desirable than the physical destruction of target systems.
The Revolution in Military Affairs has transformed the role of technology and doctrines in fighting wars. The aim now is to isolate the enemys command and control structures, augment psychological warfare and precision strikes on the critical vulnerabilities deep inside enemy territory.
These changes favour employment of air power more than any other form of military power. The importance of sequential advantage in warfare has been recognised and its relationship with force and space appreciated. As such, air power today applies parallel force at all levels of war. The strategic, operational and tactical levels themselves have been merged and are now more related to functionality than to location or type of targets.
The networking of sensors, operators and decision makers has significantly reduced the sensor-to-shooter time period. This has also resulted in transforming linear warfare into non-linear warfare. The increased focus today is on knowledge and effect and to apply forces synergistically to achieve the desired outcome in the shortest period of time, with minimum casualties and collateral damage.
The conflicts and developments of the past three decades indicate a growing role for air forces.
In fact, certain air campaigns conducted in the s and s led to the emergence of a school of thought that believed that wars could be won entirely by air forces. However, the IAF does not subscribe to this view since it is based on the experiences of air forces pitted against markedly inferior militaries with little or no air power capabilities. Our experience indicates that in almost every war fought since independence, the IAF has played a significant, and at times a pivotal role. It is also clear that air power can best be exploited not only in synergy with the other two components of the military, but also in tandem with diplomatic efforts and other national civil processes.
The spectrum of modern conflict is significantly different and modern wars, whether conventional or sub-conventional with or without a nuclear overhang cannot be won singly by any one of the three primary components of military power. Modern conflicts can be decisively influenced only by each component of military power operating in synergy with each other and optimally exploiting the unique attributes of its medium of operation air, land and sea to achieve national objectives.
Since the objective is common, joint operations would be the most logical response to national challenges.
Integrated and joint operations are the cornerstone of modern military operations and air power must be seen as the binding factor. This is so, mainly because land and naval forces historically operated independent of each other until the advent of air power. It is air power that enables land and naval forces to undertake sustained operations beyond their physical operating mediums, leading to the increasingly accepted perception that air power is the lynchpin of joint operations.
They have evolved from the experience of previous wars and are designed to provide a better understanding of combat operations.
However, the characteristics of wars have undergone significant changes due to the considerable technological advances. These have led to changes in the hitherto accepted principles and introduced a few new ones that reflect the changing nature of warfare.
Selection and Maintenance of Aim. This would be a combined Politico-Military aim. In war, it is essential to identify an aim clearly so as to provide a focus to all elements involved in warfare.
Thereafter, synchronised efforts must be made for its attainment. Since war is an extension of state policy, military aims are based on political objectives. The military aim should ensure maximum post conflict advantage while being achievable. The aim must be decided after due consideration of all politico-military factors and it should be modified if there is a change in circumstances. All components of national power should be focused towards attaining this aim. The key to air power is targeting and the key to targeting is intelligence relating to the potential enemys intentions, dispositions and the likely pattern of his operations.
Intelligence is vital for identifying the enemys crucial vulnerabilities, weaknesses and strengths and his Centres of Gravity which in turn will help in devising an effective strategy. A force needs precise intelligence if it is to employ precision weapons. Intelligence also has a direct bearing on the attainment of effect and managing change. Maintenance of Morale. Morale is a state of mind, but it is very sensitive to material conditions.
It remains high when it is based on a clear understanding of the assigned task, periodic practical training and discipline.
It is especially responsive to good leadership and effective leadership can sustain high morale even when all other factors go against it. It is adversely affected by inferior or inefficient equipment and poor administration. History shows that success in battle is the best stimulant for morale. In the case of asymmetric warfare, morale can play a significant role due to the involvement of the civilian population.
The factors important for the maintenance of morale include dynamic leadership, sound administration, discipline and the welfare of personnel. Offensive Action.
In conventional wars, offensive action was the prime means of seizing the initiative and establishing moral ascendancy over the enemy. This entailed control over the purpose, scope and intensity of operations while placing premium on early action.
In unconventional or sub-conventional conflict, the initiative may not be with the state and pre-emptive action without proper 14 principles of war and the nature of air power intelligence may prove counterproductive. Hence, most states end up reacting to situations rather than taking a pro-active approach. However, the freedom to act at a place and time of ones choosing even while reacting to a scenario, would wrest the initiative from the enemy at any level of conflict.
In these circumstances, the emphasis should be more on achieving and exploiting freedom of action across all levels and dimensions of war as well as denial of the same to the opponent. This would need accurate real time intelligence, physical and information security, a sound and focused strategy, technology savvy forces, effective deployment, synergy of effort, prompt offensive action and sound logistics. The side that loses freedom of action loses its ability to influence the conduct of war.
Concentration of Force. Traditionally, success in war depended on the ability to field forces superior to those of the enemy at a particular time and place. However, modern concepts of warfare look at systemic targeting and ensuring strategic paralysis rather than the amassing of forces. It is better to concentrate decisive fire power on crucial locations and vulnerabilities to achieve the desired effect. Air power with its ability to circumvent the enemys massed forces, coupled with superior technological capabilities that go beyond visual range engagements and standoff weapons has changed the focus from the earlier concept of concentrating mass to concentrating fire power at the decisive point.
Effects and not mass lie at the heart of concentrating air power. Economy of Effort. Economy of effort is the principle of judiciously employing available resources in warfare. However with the advent of effects based operations, it may be more prudent to view this principle as attainment of the desired effect. By shifting the focus to attainment of effect rather than merely economising effort, the emphasis shifts to the goal rather than the means. Further, economy of effort automatically forms part of attainment of effect, because achieving the desired outcome by causing functional paralysis is always more economical than causing physical destruction of target systems.
The physical protection of assets and information denial is essential for all military operations since it enables friendly forces to achieve their objectives despite enemy interference. Adequate measures must be taken to ensure their physical security on ground even against asymmetric attacks.
There is a need, therefore, to not only physically guard these vital assets but also have electronic surveillance devices in place to supplement physical surveillance both during peace and in war. Deception and Surprise. Speed, reach and elevation endow air power with a high degree of inherent surprise.
Surprise plays the greatest role in war, and its effect on morale is great. In some operations, particularly when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may prove essential to success. Surprise can be achieved through a manoeuvre, or by exploiting a new doctrine and technology. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity, timing and speed. Deception can be combined with initiative and innovation to increase the element of surprise.
Flexibility and Managing Change.
Armed forces should be able to adapt themselves to change. This could be termed as Managing Change and goes beyond flexibility and can also be achieved by flexibility in employing combat power. The change could occur in the various dimensions of war land, sea and air and also at the various levels of warfare tactical, operational or strategic.
The purpose should be to derive maximum advantage from the altered circumstances. It would require initiative, mobility and flexibility to be encompassed into one philosophy. The enactment of the Indian Air Force Act   stipulated out their auxiliary status and enforced the adoption of the Royal Air Force uniforms, badges, brevets and insignia. He went on to become Marshal of the Air Force.
RAF and IAF pilots would train by flying with their non-native air wings to gain combat experience and communication proficiency. In , when India became a republic, the prefix was dropped and it reverted to being the Indian Air Force. After it became independent from the British Empire in , British India was partitioned into the new states of the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. Along the lines of the geographical partition, the assets of the air force were divided between the new countries.
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India's air force retained the name of the Royal Indian Air Force, but three of the ten operational squadrons and facilities, located within the borders of Pakistan, were transferred to the Royal Pakistan Air Force.
With Pakistani forces moving into the state, its Maharaja decided to accede to India in order to receive military help. And this was when a good management of logistics came into help. The squadron started undertaking operational missions in November.
Probing flights by some fighters and bombers were carried out from 8—18 December to draw out the Portuguese Air Force , but to no avail. Two Portuguese transport aircraft a Super Constellation and a DC-6 found on the airfield were left alone so that they could be captured intact. However the Portuguese pilots managed to take off the aircraft from the still damaged airfield and made their getaway to Portugal.
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The President of India is the Supreme Commander of all Indian armed forces and by virtue of that fact is the national Commander-in-chief of the Air Force. Our experience indicates that in almost every war fought since independence, the IAF has played a significant, and at times a pivotal role.
The squadron started undertaking operational missions in November.