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Toutes les informations de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France sur: Vom Kriege - Carl von Clausewitz () De la guerra (espagnol; castillan) Documents à propos de l'oeuvre Vom Kriege () / Carl von Clausewitz ( ) Outils. Imprimer la page; Exporter en PDF · Signaler un problème sur la page. NOTE: This version of Carl von Clausewitz's On War is the long-obsolete J.J. Graham translation of Clausewitz's Vom Kriege () published in London in. che di Clausewitz scriveRUPERT S MITH, L'arte della guerra nel mondo .ch/ wc/acw/sub/vmi/VMI/PDFs/ 37 Mario Ragionieri, Introduzione allo studio di Karl von Clausewitz e del suo.

Yes, Clausewitz messed in the field, the day after Waterloo. But Jomini sentenced that Russia would win the Crimean War; and to preserve his eternal principles he wished to stop the arms race as Joshua did the chariot of the sun. What Scharnhorst and Gneisenau asked him was not to discuss their ideas, but to educate to war the philosophes — a task that was very hard to accomplish with warlike and bloody tribe as they are And this was exactly what Clausewitz has done, even posthumously.

He moved from sagata to togata militia, jubilated by his colleagues and welcomed by the savants, starting with Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz. If in military literature Clausewitzians seem to be like Savonarolians in the Catholic pulpits, franc-penseurs unifluential upon establishments, they do have an edge as military historians. The outillage intellectuel deriving from Vom Kriege works better when writing the history of a war than for fighting it.

Prospettive retrospettive, Jovene, Napoli, , pp. Peloponnesian war? But this concept is a powerful key in the hands of historians.

Trafalgar, f. Secondly, Vom Kriege is not only a chapter of the history of military thought, but also a useful introduction to such a sophisticated discipline.


Military history and history of military thought are not the only fields Vom Kriege sowed. Philosophy and Political theory, Psychoanalysis and Germanistics are as well: and this last four fields of study are by far preponderant in the Italian contributions. It is for this reason that Italian essays on Clausewitz continue to be separate from the studies conducted by the international mainstream, which pertain especially to military history.

The Italian contribution may be likened to a muddy river, in which, however, specks of gold may be found.

The reciprocal influence between tactics and fortification, f.

See also V. Luciano Canfora frames the early Greek literature on history and geography It means that they originate and circulate only in their own discipline, ignoring and being ignored by the rest. However these are, if only, original lectures. Some are valuable as private notes marking progress in self- education, but often the author simply ends up popularizing Vom Kriege, believing that, being the first among his friends or colleagues, he is too in his own country, if not in his century.

Much more about nineteenth-century Italian Clausewitzians one can find in other monumental books on the Italian military thought owed to our beloved friend Botti Il pensiero militare e navale italiano dalla rivoluzione francese alla prima guerra mondiale , 3 vols.

Bearing in mind that translation was not indispensable at the time, French being then well known not only in Piedmont33, but in all the Italy. Therefore, the fact that Clausewitz was almost ignored in Italy during the Risorgimento may not be imputed to a linguistic barrier; Vom Kriege was translated in French back to by Belgian Major Jean N.

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In Carlo De Cristoforis , the next after Blanch among the most prominent military writers of Risorgimento, quoted Clausewitz seventeen times, while not including Vom Kriege in the list of books consulted approximately forty. De Cristoforis, however, took nothing from Clausewitz, being rather obsessed by the principle of the mass, which he believed to have discovered first Andrea Zambelli La guerra, Tenente generale, ajutante di campo di S.

Vita politica e militare di Napoleone, raccontata da lui medesimo al tribunale di Cesare, Alessandro e Federico, Livorno, tip. Vignozzi, The latter i. Rivista Militare , and was interrupted by the death of Colonel Botti, who was able to translate and comment only the first three chapters..

The progress, in contemporary times, is that the Italian Military Libraries had directly wasted their books. Tanera, The book includes pp.

In it was translated for the first time in English, and in Niccola Marselli , an Italian officer educated in the Hegelian clubs of Naples, discussed the Clausewitzian ideas about moral factors in depth.

Marselli, having abandoned idealism and converted to positivism, disagreed with the impossibility of creating a complete theory of war, and asserted his faith in a positive science of War Nevertheless Marselli criticized the doctrinarism of Jomini and admired Clausewitz to the point where he considered him to be a precursor of positivism. It took half century before a new Clausewitzian wave to come forth into the Italian culture. And when that time came, it was the Axis time.

In Colonel Emilio Canevari , a brillant officer from Viterbo who fell in disgrace during the Re-conquest of Lybia, began a new life as freelance journalist, publishing an anthology Marte of great captains and military writers with Giuseppe Prezzolini In he published an essay on Clausewitz and Modern War Clausewitz e la guerra odierna. It took four years, however, before a political detainee like Antonio Gramsci could read a notice of the book.

He commented in his notebook that Vom Kriege was not yet translated in Italian40, that the only book in circulation was that of Canevari, and that Admiral Sirianni, in a paper, 37 A.

Mola Ed. Marco Scardigli, Lo scrittoio del generale. La romanzesca epopea risorgimentale del gen. Govone, Torino, Utet, Pagine scelte, transl. Beria and W. One can only suppose that the book Canevari wrote also spurred the short intervention on Clausewitz written in the late by Benedetto Croce The philosopher, however, does not quote Canevari: he indeed had a direct and better knowledge of Vom Kriege in its 5th Edition of and of the relevant literature Croce agrees with Roques about the influence Machiavelli had on Clausewitz, refusing the supposed Hegelian imprinting But it is impossible to summarize such an essay.

Croce wrote also 41 Passato e presente, Einaudi, Torino, , p. Gramsci quoted Clausewitz also about the attack which exhausts itself progressing Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo stato moderno, Einaudi, Torino, , p. On military entries of the Treccani encyclopedia, see Botti and Ilari, Il pensiero, cit. The Clausewitzian essay was reprint in in Strategia globale No.

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Aron does not quote this essay in his Clausewitz of , but in his Memories p. Indeed, in December see La Vita Italiana Canevari polemicized against the attempt philosopher Julius Evola made to found the totalitarian state, mixing the Schmittian Begriff des Politischen and the total war Erich Ludendorff had theorized.

Moreover the editors of Princeton Makers of Modern Strategy commissioned the chapter on Clausewitz to a true specialist, the German Jewish historian Hans Rothfels These seminal Clausewitzian studies were part of the Western intellectual mobilization against the Axis.

VIII Croce, Riscontri tra l'arte della guerra e le arti belle nel Clausewitz, in Quaderni della "Critica", n. Milivoj G. Clausewitz, Carl von. O Ratu. Milivoj Lazarevic, ed.

Fog of war

Yugoslav military publishing house, Jehuda L. Bollati had experience translating, having already translated Hindenburg, von Bernardi and Falkenhayn, as well as many documents of the German State and Austrian War archives Paradoxically enough, there would be no written documents about the translation: according to the oral tradition of the Ufficio storico, the true translator was actually an academician and Bollati and Canevari only revised the military terminology.

Quite surprisingly, the Google-books list of the Clausewitzian works published in all languages during the Second World War does not include the Ufficio storico translation, perhaps because it did not circulate outside the Army Staff. There are, however, two partial translations on the google list that were both published by Le Monnier in and Sansoni in They are only Italian editions of propagandistic pamphlets published in the Third Reich in the Google list they are eight, from 48 to pages in length, with titles as Brevier, Kathechismus, Grundgedanken and so on.

Italian contributions to the Clausewitz-Renaissance The political misfortune of Clausewitz reached bottom when Hitler named after him the desperate plan to defend Berlin.

Werner Hahlweg was, with his critical edition and his short biography53, to restore him to the quietness of the military studies. Initially, however, approval of Vom Kriege was limited to German scholars, as is proven by its anthological application to the nuclear era written by Gerd Stamp, a former ace of the Luftwaffe who was working for NATO at the time.

Pensieri sulla guerra, Firenze, Sansoni, , pp. In these two auroral decades, when outside Germany only Peter Paret worked on Clausewitz in original way56, Piero Pieri was to popularize Vom Kriege once more in postwar Italy, beyond the circle of uniformed scholars.

His study on Italian military writers primarily regards the connection between war and politics, but in the chapter about Marselli the Clausewitzian epistemology of the military science is also discussed Furthermore, he summarized the pivotal ideas of Vom Kriege, in four pages , using them to criticize Blanch and De Cristoforis Bemerkungen und Hinweise.

Beck, Munchen, , in "Der Staat", N. See also Id. In the Sixties, Ernesto Ragionieri 61 and Clemente Ancona62 contributed to the studies on the Clausewitzian lectures of Marx and Lenin, and Filippo Gaja, director of Maquis, the only military periodical of the Italian Left, published an integral translation of the Lenin notes on Vom Kriege This first wave of the renewed attention to 60 On the point see Bassford, Cl. I documenti. Ruge, Politica e strategia.

Pensiero politico e azione politica, Firenze, Sansoni, Clausewitz in postwar Italy culminated in with the paperback reprint by Mondadori, one of major Italian publishers , of the translation of Vom Kriege, thus guaranteeing for the first time its countrywide circulation A century after the French-Prussian War, which secured the fortune of Vom Kriege, a new Western defeat, that of the United States in Vietnam, ensured the definitive foundation of the Clausewitzian studies.

Just in the new English translation of Paret and Michael Howard, the two fundamental essays of Paret and Aron and a new essay of a student of Hahlweg71 were published. Looking with admiration to the East German military mass education, Colonel Rodolfo Guiscardo opened back to the nationalistic cult of Clausewitz Leben und Werk, Esslingen, Bechtle, See Id,, Clausewitz.

Lastly, even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered state often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this also must modify the degree of tension and the vigour of the efforts made is evident in itself.

In this manner the whole act of war is removed from under the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgment to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it; and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the laws of probability.

Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions but individual states and governments, once the war is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found. From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly.

Here, now, forces itself again into consideration a question which we had laid aside see No. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object.

Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his are, the smaller will ours require to be.

Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether. Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force, and also the amount of effort to be made.

This it cannot be in itself; but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration.

It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion.

This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two states, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as for example the conquest of a province. At other times, the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace.

But, also, in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the states concerned is always supposed. There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two states from other causes, and, therefore, there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive.

If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and that in a greater degree the more the political object dominates; and so is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a war of extermination, down to the mere use of an army of observation.

This, however, leads to a question of another kind which we have hereafter to develop and answer. However insignificant the political claims mutually advanced, however weak the means put forth, however small the aim to which military action is directed, can this action be suspended even for a moment?

This is a question which penetrates deeply into the nature of the subject. Every transaction requires for its accomplishment a certain time which we call its duration. This may be longer or shorter, according as the person acting throws more or less despatch into his movements.

About this more or less we shall not trouble ourselves here. Each person acts in his own fashion; but the slow person does not protract the thing because he wishes to spend more time about it, but because, by his nature, he requires more time, and if he made more haste, would not do the thing so well. This time, therefore, depends on subjective causes, and belongs to the length, so-called, of the action.

If we allow now to every action in war this, its length, then we must assume, at first sight at least, that any expenditure of time beyond this length, that is, every suspension of hostile action appears an absurdity; with respect to this it must not be forgotten that we now speak not of the progress of one or other of the two opponents, but of the general progress of the whole action of the war. If two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it; as long now as they continue armed, that is do not come to terms of peace, this feeling must exist; and it can only be brought to a standstill by either side by one single motive alone, which is, that he waits for a more favourable moment for action.

Now at first sight it appears that this motive can never exist except on one side, because it, eo ipso , must be prejudicial to the other. If the one has an interest in acting, then the other must have an interest in waiting.

A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action, for during this suspension he who has the positive object that is the assailant must continue progressing; for if we should imagine an equilibrium in this way, that he who has the positive object, therefore the strongest motive, can at the same time only command the lesser means, so that the equation is made up by the product of the motive and the power, then we must say, if no alteration in this condition of equilibrium is to be expected, the two parties must make peace; but if an alteration is to be expected, then it can only be favourable to one side, and therefore the other has a manifest interest to act without delay.

We see that the conception of an equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of arms, but that it ends in the question of the expectation of a more favourable moment. Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two states has a positive object, as, for instance, the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces—which is to be utilised in the settlement of peace.

After this conquest his political object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases, and for him a pause ensues. If the adversary is also contented with this solution he will make peace, if not he must act.

Now, if we suppose that in four weeks he will be in a better condition to act, then he has sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action. But from that moment the logical course for the enemy appears to be to act that he may not give the conquered party the desired time. Of course, in this mode of reasoning a complete insight into the state of circumstances on both sides, is supposed.

If this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really existed, the effect would be that everything would again be driven towards the extreme; for irrespective of the effect of such incessant activity in inflaming the feelings and infusing into the whole a greater degree of passion, a greater elementary force, there would also follow from this continuance of action, a stricter continuity, a closer connection between cause and effect, and thus every single action would become of more importance, and consequently more replete with danger.

But we know that the course of action in war has seldom or never this unbroken continuity, and that there have been many wars in which action occupied by far the smallest portion of time employed, the whole of the rest being consumed in inaction. It is impossible that this should be always an anomaly, and suspension of action in war must be possible, that is no contradiction in itself.

We now proceed to show this, and how it is. As we have supposed the interests of one commander to be always antagonistic to those of the other, we have assumed a true polarity. We reserve a fuller explanation of this for another chapter, merely making the following observation on it at present.

The principle of polarity is only valid when it can be conceived in one and the same thing, where the positive and its opposite the negative, completely destroy each other. In a battle both sides strive to conquer; that is true polarity, for the victory of the one side destroys that of the other.

But when we speak of two different things, which have a common relation external to themselves, then it is not the things but their relations which have the polarity. Polarity is, therefore, not applicable to them. If there was only one form of war, to wit the attack of the enemy, therefore no defence; or in other words, if the attack was distinguished from the defence merely by the positive motive, which the one has and the other has not, but the fight precisely one and the same: But action in war is divided into two forms, attack and defence, which, as we shall hereafter explain more particularly, are very different and of unequal strength.

Polarity, therefore, lies in that to which both bear a relation, in the decision, but not in the attack or defence itself.

If the one commander wishes the solution put off, the other must wish to hasten it; but certainly only in the same form of combat. If it is A's interest not to attack his enemy at present but four weeks hence, then it is B's interest to be attacked, not four weeks hence, but at the present moment.

This is the direct antagonism of interests, but it by no means follows that it would be for B's interest to attack A at once. That is plainly something totally different. If the form of defence is stronger than that of offence, as we shall hereafter show, the question arises, Is the advantage of a deferred decision as great on the one side as the advantage of the defensive form on the other? If it is not, then it cannot by its counter-weight overbalance the latter, and thus influence the progress of the action of the war.

We see, therefore, that the impulsive force existing in the polarity of interests may be lost in the difference between the strength of the offensive and defensive, and thereby become ineffectual.

If, therefore, that side for which the present is favourable is too weak to be able to dispense with the advantage of the defensive, he must put up with the unfavourable prospects which the future holds out; for it may still be better to fight a defensive battle in the unpromising future than to assume the offensive or make peace at present. Now, being convinced that the superiority of the defensive rightly understood is very great, and much greater than may appear at first sight, we conceive that the greater number of those periods of inaction which occur in war are thus explained without involving any contradiction.

The weaker the motives to action are, the more will those motives be absorbed and neutralised by this difference between attack and defence, the more frequently, therefore, will action in warfare be stopped, as indeed experience teaches.

But there is still another cause which may stop action in war, that is an incomplete view of the situation. Each commander can only fully know his own position; that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports, which are uncertain; he may, therefore, form a wrong judgment with respect to it upon data of this description, and, in consequence of that error, he may suppose that the initiative is properly with his adversary when it is really with himself.

This want of perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as untimely inaction, and so it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in war. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in war to a standstill without involving a contradiction.

But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute very much to stop action in war, and to modify the principle of action.

The possibility of a standstill brings into the action of war a new modification, inasmuch as it dilutes that action with the element of Time, checks the influence or sense of danger in its course, and increases the means of reinstating a lost balance of force. The greater the tension of feelings from which the war springs, the greater, therefore, the energy with which it is carried on, so much the shorter will be the periods of inaction; on the other hand, the weaker the principle of warlike activity, the longer will be these periods: But the slower the action proceeds in war, the more frequent and longer the periods of inaction, so much the more easily can an error be repaired; therefore so much the bolder a general will be in his calculations, so much the more readily will he keep them below the line of absolute, and build everything upon probabilities and conjecture.

Thus, according as the course of the war is more or less slow, more or less time will be allowed for that which the nature of a concrete case particularly requires, calculation of probability based on given circumstances.

We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of war makes it a calculation of probabilities; now there is only one single element still wanting to make it a game, and that element it certainly is not without: There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as war.

But along with chance, the accidental, and along with it good luck, occupy a great place in war. If we now take a look at the subjective nature of war, that is at those powers with which it is carried on, it will appear to us still more like a game.

The element in which the operations of war are carried on is danger; but which of all the moral qualities is the first in danger? Now certainly courage is quite compatible with prudent calculation, but still they are things of quite a different kind, essentially different qualities of the mind; on the other hand, daring reliance on good fortune, boldness, rashness, are only expressions of courage, and all these propensities of the mind look for the fortuitous or accidental , because it is their element.

We see therefore how from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, no where finds any sure basis in the calculations in the art of war; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes war of all branches of human activity the most like a game of cards.

Although our intellect always feels itself urged towards clearness and certainty, still our mind often feels itself attracted by uncertainty.

Instead of threading its way with the understanding along the narrow path of philosophical investigations and logical conclusions, in order almost unconscious of itself, to arrive in spaces where it feels itself a stranger, and where it seems to part from all well known objects, it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms of chance and luck. Instead of living yonder on poor necessity, it revels here in the wealth of possibilities; animated thereby, courage then takes wings to itself, and daring and danger make the element into which it launches itself, as a fearless swimmer plunges into the stream.

Shall theory leave it here, and move on, self satisfied with absolute conclusions and rules? Then it is of no practical use. Theory must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The art of war has to deal with living and with moral forces; the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive. There is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental; and just as much in the greatest things as in the smallest.

As there is room for this accidental on the one hand, so on the other there must be courage and self-reliance in proportion to the room left. If these qualities are forthcoming in a high degree, the margin left may likewise be great. Courage and self reliance are therefore principles quite essential to war; consequently theory must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues.

In daring there may still be wisdom also, and prudence as well, only that they are estimated by a different standard of value.

Its more particular definition. Such is war; such the commander who conducts it; such the theory which rules it. But war is no pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of a free enthusiasm; it is a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means.

The war of a community—of whole nations and particularly of civilised nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act. Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained and absolute expression of force, as we had to deduce it from its mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements.

This is how the thing has really been viewed hitherto, whenever a want of harmony between policy and the conduct of a war has led to theoretical distinctions of the kind. But it is not so, and the idea is radically false.

War in the real world, as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge; it is the operation of powers which do not develop themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure, but which at one time expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance opposed by inertia or friction, while at another they are too weak to produce an effect; it is therefore, in a certain measure, a pulsation of violent force more or less vehement, consequently making its discharges and exhausting its powers more or less quickly, in other words conducting more or less quickly to the aim, but always lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted on it in its course, so as to give it this or that direction, in short to be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence.

Now if we reflect that war has its root in a political object, then naturally this original motive which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in the conduct of it. Still the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and through that is often completely changed, but it always remains that which has a prior right to consideration.

Policy therefore is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it as far as the nature of the forces exploding in it will permit.

We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.

All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the art of war in general and the commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one.

But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.Carl von Clausewitz's On War has been called, "not simply the greatest, but the only truly great book on war.

It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application, that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute very much to stop action in war, and to modify the principle of action. We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.

Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two states has a positive object, as, for instance, the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces—which is to be utilised in the settlement of peace.