resourceone.info Biography Guerilla Warfare Book

GUERILLA WARFARE BOOK

Monday, June 3, 2019


Guerrilla Warfare is a military handbook written by Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara. Published in following the Cuban Revolution, it became a reference. Guerrilla Warfare and millions of other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Guerrilla Warfare Paperback – October 15, This item:Guerrilla Warfare by Ernesto Che Guevara Paperback $ resourceone.info - Buy Guerrilla Warfare book online at best prices in India on Amazon. in. Read Guerrilla Warfare book reviews & author details and more at.


Guerilla Warfare Book

Author:NETTIE TAULMAN
Language:English, Spanish, French
Country:Denmark
Genre:Science & Research
Pages:450
Published (Last):24.06.2016
ISBN:224-4-69583-899-8
ePub File Size:16.35 MB
PDF File Size:10.43 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Regsitration Required]
Downloads:42516
Uploaded by: BERNADINE

Guerrilla Warfare book. Read reviews from the world's largest community for readers. Che Guevara, the larger-than-life hero of the revolutionary. GUERRILLA warfare has been employed on innumer- guerrilla warfare have become a question for theoretical discussions .. learned from text-books alone. Find Guerrilla warfare books online. Get the best Guerrilla warfare books at our marketplace.

Yet few such campaigns have ever worked. Better to look at "air raiding" through more irregular eyes, such as those of Orde Wingate. This British general pioneered the concept of "deep penetration" of small raiding forces, inserted and supplied from the air. It is a concept he tried out with some success in Burma during World War II, but his ideas still await full development. For those counting, you know that I have two choices left. Both books were written over 40 years ago, and both remain exceptionally timely.

The 10 books I have outlined here — all quite short save for Glubb and Callwell — provide nice complements to the West Point list and may prove a bit more relevant to the wars of our time and conflicts to come.

In order to do all this the absolute cooperation of the people and a perfect knowledge of the ground is necessary.

These two necessities affect every minute of the life of the guerrilla fighter. Therefore, along with centers for study of present and future zones of operations, intensive popular work must be undertaken to explain the motives of the revolution, its ends, and to spread the incontrovertible truth that victory of the enemy against the people is finally impossible.

Whoever does not feel this undoubted truth cannot be a guerrilla fighter. This popular work should at first be aimed at securing secrecy; that is, each peasant, each member of the society in which action is taking place, will be asked not to mention what he sees and hears; later, help will be sought from inhabitants whose loyalty to the revolution offers greater guarantees; still later, use will be made of these persons in missions of contact, for transporting goods or arms, as guides in the zones familiar to them; still later, it is possible to arrive at organized mass action in the centers of work, of which the final result will be the general strike.

The strike is a most important factor in civil war, but in order to reach it a series of complementary conditions are necessary which do not always exist and which very rarely come to exist spontaneously. It is necessary to create these essential conditions, basically by explaining the purposes of the revolution and by demonstrating the forces of the people and their possibilities.

It is also possible to have recourse to certain very homogeneous groups, which must have shown their efficacy previously in less dangerous tasks, in order to make use of another of the terrible arms of the guerrilla band, sabotage.

It is possible to paralyze entire armies, to suspend the industrial life of a zone, leaving the inhabitants of a city without factories, without light, without water, without communications of any kind, without being able to risk travel by highway except at certain hours.

If all this is achieved, the morale of the enemy falls, the morale of his combatant units weakens, and the fruit ripens for plucking at a precise moment. All this presupposes an increase in the territory included within the guerrilla action, but an excessive in- crease of this territory is to be avoided. It is essential always to preserve a strong base of operations and to continue strengthening it during the course of the war. Within this territory, measures of indoctrination of the inhabitants of the zone should be utilized; measures of quarantine should be taken against the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution; all the purely defensive measures, such as trenches, mines, and communications, should be perfected.

When the guerrilla band has reached a respectable power in arms and in number of combatants, it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns. This is an act similar to that of the beehive when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the swarm.

The mother hive with the most notable guerrilla chief will stay in the less dangerous places, while the new columns will penetrate other enemy territories following the cycle already described. A moment will arrive in which the territory occupied by the columns is too small for them; and in the advance toward regions solidly defended by the enemy, it will be necessary to confront powerful forces. At that instant the columns join, they offer a compact, fighting front, and a war of positions is reached, a war carried on by regular armies.

However, the former guerrilla army cannot cut itself off from its base, and it should create new guerrilla bands behind the enemy acting in the same way as the original bands operated earlier, proceeding thus to penetrate enemy territory until it is dominated. It is thus that guerrillas reach the stage of attack, of the encirclement of fortified bases, of the defeat of reinforcements, of mass action, ever more ardent, in the whole national territory, arriving finally at the objective of the war: victory.

In one sense they complement strategy and in an-other they are more specific rules within it. As means, tactics are much more variable, much more flexible than the final objectives, and they should be adjusted continually during the struggle. There are tactical objectives that remain constant throughout a war and others that vary. The first thing to be considered is the adjusting of guerrilla action to the action of the enemy. The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility.

This permits it in a few minutes to move far from a specific theater and in a few hours far even from the region, if that becomes necessary; permits it constantly to change front and avoid any type of encirclement. As the circumstances of the war require, the guerrilla band can dedicate itself exclusively to fleeing from an encirclement which is the enemy's only way of forcing the band into a decisive fight that could be unfavorable; it can also change the battle into a counter-encirclement small bands of men are presumably surrounded by the enemy when suddenly the enemy is surrounded by stronger contingents; or men located in a safe place serve as a lure, leading to the encirclement and annihilation of the entire troops and supply of an attacking force.

Characteristic of this war of mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla bands encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from the four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid being encircled themselves; the fight is started at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual contact, and initiates its attack from another point.

The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band the same. Thus, successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large quantities of ammunition and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers.

This same tactic can be applied at nighttime, closing in more and showing greater aggressiveness, because in these conditions counter-encirclement is much more difficult.

Movement by night is another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, enabling it to advance into position for an attack and, where the danger of betrayal exists, to mobilize in new territory.

The numerical inferiority of the guerrilla makes it necessary that attacks always be carried out by surprise; this great advantage is what permits the guerrilla fighter to inflict losses on the enemy without suffering losses.

In a fight between a hundred men on one side and ten on the other, losses are not equal where there is one casualty on each side. The enemy loss is always reparable; it amounts to only one percent of his effectiveness. The loss of the guerrilla band requires more time to be repaired because it involves a soldier of high specialization and is ten percent of the operating forces.

A dead soldier of the guerrillas ought never to be left with his arms and his ammunition. The duty of every guerrilla soldier whenever a companion falls is to recover immediately these extremely precious elements of the fight.

In fact, the care which must be taken of ammunition and the method of using it are further characteristics of guerrilla warfare. In any combat between a regular force and a guerrilla band it is always possible to know one from the other by their different manner of fire: a great amount of firing on the part of the regular army, sporadic and accurate shots on the part of the guerrillas. Once one of our heroes, now dead, had to employ his machine guns for nearly five minutes, burst after burst, in order to slow up the advance of enemy soldiers.

This fact caused considerable confusion in our forces, because they assumed from the rhythm of fire that key position must have been taken by the enemy, since this was one of the rare occasions where departure from the rule of saving fire had been called for because of the importance of the point being defended. Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt himself to all circumstances, and to convert to his service all of the accidents of the action.

Against the rigidity of classical methods of fighting, the guerrilla fighter invents his own tactics at every minute of the fight and constantly surprises the enemy.

In the first place, there are only elastic positions, specific places that the enemy cannot pass, and places of diverting him. Frequently the enemy, after easily overcoming difficulties in a gradual advance, is surprised to find himself suddenly and solidly detained without possibilities of moving forward. This is due to the fact that the guerrilla-defended positions, when they have been selected on the basis of a careful study of the ground, are invulnerable.

It is not the number of attacking soldiers that counts, but the number of defending soldiers.

Guerrilla Warfare (book)

Once that number has been placed there, it can nearly always hold off a battalion with success. It is a major task of the chiefs to choose well the moment and the place for defending a position without retreat. The form of attack of a guerrilla army is also different; starting with surprise and fury, irresistible, it suddenly converts itself into total passivity. The surviving enemy, resting, believes that the attacker has departed; he begins to relax, to return to the routine life of the camp or of the fortress, when suddenly a new attack bursts forth in another place, with the same characteristics, while the main body of the guerrilla band lies in wait to intercept reinforcements.

At other times an outpost defending the camp will be suddenly attacked by the guerrilla, dominated, and captured. The fundamental thing is surprise and rapidity of attack. Acts of sabotage are very important. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and in-discriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution.

Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful.

But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable, since it brings on an increase of reprisals, including deaths. There is one point very much in controversy in Opinions about terrorism.

Many consider that its use, by provoking police oppression, hinders all more or less legal or semiclandestine contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment. This is correct; but it also happens that in a civil war the repression by the governmental power in certain towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed already, and any action of the masses that is not supported by arms is impossible.

It is therefore necessary to be circumspect in adopting methods of this type and to consider the consequences that they may bring for the revolution. At any rate, well-managed sabotage is always a very effective arm, though it should not be employed to put means of production out of action, leaving a sector of the population paralyzed and thus without work unless this paralysis affects the normal life of the society.

It is ridiculous to carry out sabotage against a soft-drink factory, but it is absolutely correct and advisable to carry out sabotage against a power plant. In the first case, a certain number of workers are put out of a job but nothing is done to modify the rhythm of industrial life; in the second case, there will again be displaced workers, but this is entirely justified by the paralysis of the life of the region. We will return to the technique of sabotage later.

One of the favorite arms of the enemy army, supposed to be decisive in modern times, is aviation. Nevertheless, this has no use whatsoever during the period that guerrilla warfare is in its first stages, with small concentrations of men in rugged places. The utility of aviation lies in the systematic destruction of visible and organized defenses; and for this there must be large concentrations of men who construct these defenses, something that does not exist in this type of warfare.

Top Authors

Planes are also potent against marches by columns through level places or places without cover; however, this latter danger is easily avoided by carrying out the marches at night. One of the weakest points of the enemy is transportation by road and railroad.

It is virtually impossible to maintain a vigil yard by yard over a transport line, a road, or a railroad. At any point a considerable amount of explosive charge can be planted that will make the road impassable; or by exploding it at the moment that a vehicle passes, a consider-able loss in lives and materiel to the enemy is caused at the same time that the road is cut.

The sources of explosives are varied. They can be brought from other zones; or use can be made of bombs seized from the dictatorship, though these do not always work; or they can be manufactured in secret laboratories within the guerrilla zone. The technique of setting them off is quite varied; their manufacture also depends upon the conditions of the guerrilla band.

In our laboratory we made powder which we used as a cap, and we invented various devices for exploding the mines at the desired moment. The ones that gave the best results were electric. The first mine that we exploded was a bomb dropped from an aircraft of the dictatorship. We adapted it by inserting various caps and adding a gun with the trigger pulled by a cord.

At the moment that an enemy truck passed, the weapon was fired to set off the explosion. These techniques can be developed to a high degree. We have information that in Algeria, for example, tele-explosive mines, that is, mines exploded by radio at great distances from the point where they are located, are being used today against the French colonial power. The technique of lying in ambush along roads in order to explode mines and annihilate survivors is one of the most remunerative in point of ammunition and arms.

The surprised enemy does not use his ammunition and has no time to flee; so with a small expenditure of ammunition large results are achieved. As blows are dealt the enemy, he also changes his tactics, and in place of isolated trucks, veritable motorized columns move.

However, by choosing the ground well, the same result can be produced by breaking the column and concentrating forces on one vehicle. In these cases the essential elements of guerrilla tactics must always be kept in mind. These are: perfect knowledge of the ground; surveillance and foresight as to the lines of escape; vigilance over all the secondary roads that can bring support to the point of attack; intimacy with people in the zone so as to have sure help from them in respect to supplies, transport, and temporary or permanent hiding places if it becomes necessary to leave wounded companions behind; numerical superiority at a chosen point of action; total mobility; and the possibility of counting on reserves.

If all these tactical requisites are fulfilled, surprise attack along the lines of communication of the enemy yields notable dividends. A fundamental part of guerrilla tactics is the treatment accorded the people of the zone. Even the treatment accorded the enemy is important; the norm to be followed should be an absolute inflexibility at the time of attack, an absolute inflexibility toward all the despicable elements that resort to informing and assassination, and clemency as absolute as possible to-ward the enemy soldiers who go into the fight performing or believing that they perform a military duty.

It is a good policy, so long as there are no considerable bases of operations and invulnerable places, to take no prisoners. Survivors ought to be set free. The wounded should be cared for with all possible resources at the time of the action. Conduct toward the civil population ought to be regulated by a large respect for all the rules and traditions of the people of the zone, in order to demonstrate effectively, with deeds, the moral superiority of the guerrilla fighter over the oppressing soldier.

Except in special situations, there ought to be no execution of justice without giving the criminal an opportunity to clear himself. An important point to consider is the moment for making contact with the enemy.

If the zone is so thick, so difficult that an organized army can never reach it, the guerrilla band should advance to the regions where the army can arrive and where there will be a possibility of combat. As soon as the survival of the guerrilla band has been assured, it should fight; it must constantly go out from its refuge to fight.

Its mobility does not have to be as great as in those cases where the ground is unfavorable; it must adjust itself to the capabilities of the enemy, but it is not necessary to be able to move as quickly as in places where the enemy can concentrate a large number of men in a few minutes. Neither is the nocturnal character of this warfare so important; it will be possible in many cases to carry out daytime operations, especially mobilizations by day, though subjected to enemy observation by land and air.

It is also possible to persist in a military action for a much longer time, above all in the mountains; it is possible to undertake battles of long duration with very few men, and it is very probable that the arrival of enemy reinforcements at the scene of the fight can be prevented. A close watch over the points of access is, however, an axiom never to be forgotten by the guerrilla fighter.

Follow the Author

His aggressiveness on account of the difficulties that the enemy faces in bringing up reinforcements can he greater, he can approach the enemy more closely, fight much more directly, more frontally and for a longer time, though these rules may be qualified by various circumstances, such, for example, as the amount of ammunition. Fighting on favorable ground and particularly in the mountains presents many advantages but also the inconvenience that it is difficult to capture in a single operation a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, owing to the precautions that the enemy takes in these regions.

The guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that it is the enemy that must serve as his source of supply of ammunition and arms. But much more rapidly than in unfavorable ground the guerrilla band will here be able to "dig in," that is, to form a base capable of engaging in a war of positions, where small industries may be in-stalled as they are needed, as well as hospitals, centers for education and training, storage facilities, organs of propaganda, etc.

The guerrilla band in these conditions can number many more personnel; there will be noncombatants and perhaps even a system of training in the use of the arms that eventually are to fall into the power of the guerrilla army. The number of men that a guerrilla band can have is a matter of extremely flexible calculation adapted to the territory, to the means available of acquiring supplies, to the mass flights of oppressed people from other zones, to the arms available, to the necessities of organization.

But, in any case, it is much more practicable to establish a base and expand with the support of new combatant elements. The radius of action of a guerrilla band of this type can be as wide as conditions or the operations of other bands in adjacent territory permit.

The range will be limited by the time that it takes to arrive at a zone of security from the zone of operation; assuming that marches must be made at night, it will not be possible to operate more than five or six hours away from a point of maximum security. Small guerrilla bands that work constantly at weakening a territory can go farther away from the zone of security. The arms preferable for this type of warfare are long-range weapons requiring small expenditure of bullets, supported by a group of automatic or semi-automatic arms.

Of the rifles and machine guns that exist in the markets of the United States, one of the best is the M-1 rifle, called the Garand. However, only people with some experience should use this, since it has the disadvantage of expending too much ammunition. Medium-heavy arms, such as tripod machine guns, can be used on favorable ground, affording a greater margin of security for the weapon and its personnel, but they ought always to be a means of repelling an enemy and not for attack.

An ideal composition for a guerrilla band of 25 men would be: 10 to 15 single-shot rifles and about 10 automatic arms between Garands and hand machine guns, including light and easily portable automatic arms, such as the Browning or the more modern Belgian FAL and M automatic rifles.

Among the hand machine-guns the best are those of nine millimeters, which permit a larger transport of ammunition. The simpler its construction the better, because this increases the case of switching parts.

All this must be adjusted to the armament that the enemy uses, Since the ammunition that he employs is what we are going to use when his arms fall into our hands. It is practically impossible for heavy arms to be used.

Aircraft cannot see anything and cease to operate; tanks and cannons cannot do much owing to the difficulties of advancing in these zones. A very important consideration is supply. In general, the zones of difficult access for this very reason present special problems, since there are few peasants, and therefore animal and food supplies are scarce.

It is necessary to maintain stable lines of communication in order to be able always to count on a minimum of food, stockpiled, in the event of any disagreeable development. In this kind of zone of operations the possibilities of sabotage on a large scale are generally not present; with the inaccessibility goes a lack of constructions, telephone lines, aqueducts, etc. For supply purposes it is important to have animals, among which the mule is the best in rough country. Adequate pasturage permitting good nutrition is essential.

The mule can pass through extremely hilly country impossible for other animals.

Guerilla Warfare.

In the most difficult situations it is necessary to resort to transport by men. Each individual can carry twenty-five kilograms for many hours daily and for many days. The lines of communication with the exterior should include a series of intermediate points manned by people of complete reliability, where products can be stored and where contacts can go to hide themselves at critical times.

Internal lines of communication can also be created. Their extension will be determined by the stage of development reached by the guerrilla band.

In some zones of operations in the recent Cuban war, telephone lines of many kilometers of length were established, roads were built, and a messenger service maintained sufficient to cover all zones in a minimum of time. There are also other possible means of communication, not used in the Cuban war but perfectly applicable, such as smoke signals, signals with sunshine reflected by mirrors, and carrier pigeons.

The vital necessities of the guerrillas are to maintain their arms in good condition, to capture ammunition, and, above everything else, to have adequate shoes.

The first manufacturing efforts should therefore be directed toward these objectives. Shoe factories can initially be cobbler installations that replace halfsoles on old shoes, expanding afterwards into a series of organized factories with a good average daily production of shoes. The manufacture of powder is fairly simple; and much can be accomplished by having a small laboratory and bringing in the necessary materials from outside. Mined areas constitute a grave danger for the enemy; large areas can be mined for simultaneous explosion, destroying up to hundreds of men.

The quantity, not the quality, of guerrilla warfare will change. For example, following the same order as before, the mobility of this type of guerrilla should be extraordinary; strikes should be made preferably at night; they should be extremely rapid but the guerrilla should move to places different from the starting point, the farthest possible from the scene of action, assuming that there is no place secure from the repressive forces that the guerrilla can use as its garrison.

A man can walk between 30 and 50 kilometers during the night hours; it is possible also to march during the first hours of daylight, unless the zones of operation are closely watched or there is danger that people in the vicinity, seeing the passing troops, will notify the pursuing army of the location of the guerrilla band and its route.

It is always preferable in these cases to operate at night with the greatest possible silence both before and after the action; the first hours of night are best. Here too there are exceptions to the general rule, since at times the dawn hours will be preferable. It is never wise to habituate the enemy to a certain form of warfare; it is necessary to vary constantly the places, the hours, and the forms of operation.

We have already said that the action cannot endure for long, but must be rapid; it must be of a high degree of effectiveness, last a few minutes, and be followed by an immediate withdrawal. The arms employed here will not be the same as in the case of actions on favorable ground; a large quantity of automatic weapons is to be preferred. In night attacks marksmanship is not the determining factor, but rather concentration of fire; the more automatic arms firing at short distance, the more possibilities there are of annihilating the enemy.

Also, the use of mines in roads and the destruction of bridges are tactics of great importance.

Attacks by the guerrilla will be less aggressive so far as the persistence and continuation are concerned, but they can be very violent, and they can utilize different arms, such as mines and the shotgun. Against open vehicles heavily loaded with men, which is the usual method of transporting troops, and even against closed vehicles that do not have special defenses- against buses, for example-the shotgun is a tremendous weapon.

A shotgun loaded with large shot is the most effective. This is not a secret of guerrilla fighters; it is used also in big wars. The Americans used shotgun platoons armed with high-quality weapons and bayonets for assaulting machine-gun nests. There is an important problem to explain, that of ammunition; this will almost always be taken from the enemy. It is therefore necessary to strike blows where there will be the absolute assurance of restoring the ammunition expended, unless there are large reserves in secure places.

In other words, an annihilating attack against a group of men is not to be under-taken at the risk of expending all ammunition without being able to replace it. Always in guerrilla tactics it is necessary to keep in mind the grave problem of procuring the war materiel necessary for continuing the fight. For this reason guerrilla arms ought to be the same as those used by the enemy, except for weapons such as revolvers and shotguns, for which the ammunition can be obtained in the zone itself or in the cities.

The number of men that a guerrilla band of this type should include does not exceed ten to fifteen. In forming a single combat unit it is of great importance always to consider the limitations on numbers: ten, twelve, fifteen men can hide anywhere and at the same time can help each other in putting up a powerful resistance to the enemy.

Four or five would perhaps be too small a number, but when the number exceeds ten the possibility that the enemy will discover them in their camp or on the march is much greater. Remember that the velocity of the guerrilla band on the march is equal to the velocity of its slowest man. It is more difficult to find uniformity of marching speed with twenty, thirty, or forty men than with ten. And the guerrilla fighter on the plain must be fundamentally a runner.

Here the practice of hitting and running acquires its maximum use. The guerrilla bands on the plain suffer the enormous inconvenience of being subject to a rapid encirclement and of not having sure places where they can set up a firm resistance; therefore they must live in conditions of absolute secrecy for a long time, since it would be dangerous to trust any neighbor whose fidelity is not perfectly established.

The reprisals of the enemy are so violent, usually so brutal, inflicted not only on the head of the family but frequently on the women and children as well, that pressure on individuals lacking firmness may result at any moment in their giving way and revealing information as to where the guerrilla band is located and how it is operating. This would immediately produce an encirclement with consequences always disagreeable, although not necessarily fatal.

When conditions, the quantity of arms, and the state of insurrection of the people call for an increase in the number of men, the guerrilla band should be divided. If it is necessary, all can rejoin at a given moment to deal a blow, but in such a way that immediately afterwards they can disperse toward separate zones, a gain divided into small groups of ten, twelve, or fifteen men.

It is entirely feasible to organize whole armies under a single command and to assure respect and obedience to this command without the necessity of being in a single group. Therefore the election of the guerrilla chiefs and the certainty that they coordinate ideologically and personally with the overall chief of the zone are very important.

The bazooka is a heavy weapon that can be used by the guerrilla band because of its easy portability and operation. Today the rifle-fired anti-tank grenade can replace it. Naturally, it will be a weapon taken from the enemy.

The bazooka is ideal for firing on armored vehicles, and even on unarmored vehicles that are loaded with troops, and for taking small military bases of few men in a short time; but it is important to point out that not more than three shells per man can be carried, and this only with considerable exertion. As for the utilization of heavy arms taken from the enemy, nothing is to be scorned. But there are weapons such as the tripod machine gun, the heavy fifty-millimeter machine gun3 etc.

In other words, in the unfavorable conditions that we are now analyzing, a battle to defend a heavy machine gun or other weapon of this type cannot be allowed; they are simply to be used until the tactical moment when they must be abandoned. In our Cuban war of liberation, to abandon a weapon constituted a grave offense, and there was never any case where the necessity arose. At this advanced stage of development, the guerrilla army-and-state develops into a symmetrical force which can achieve victory over its enemy.

Chapter III: Organization of the Guerrilla Front[ edit ] The third chapter describes the daily life in the friendly territory inhabited by the guerrilla fighter, and details its various support activities for a war effort. Supply[ edit ] As the guerrillas establish control in given areas, a supply chain must be established to satisfy all of the force's needs, particularly food, salt, and leather for shoes.

Peasant farmers can give a portion of their work product to the guerrillas, and supply caches should be stored throughout the countryside.

Mules are excellent beasts of burden for guerrilla needs, both because they can shoulder heavy loads, and also because they can traverse the rough ground which is the guerrilla's native territory.

If there is enough social cohesion between the guerrillas and the peasants, taxes can also be levied. Civil Organization[ edit ] In order to keep trust with the peasants, guerrillas must also establish forms of civil government in the friendly areas, to administer justice and de facto solutions for day-to-day problems, functions no longer performed in the zone by the alienated enemy state. The Role of the Woman[ edit ] Women's capacity to contribute to a guerrilla effort should not be underestimated, and contrary to popular belief, their presence in a unit does not cause sexual tension.

Women can conduct combat, and are especially useful as messengers, because they have greater freedom of movement in hostile territory than single men do. Women can also assist as cooks and nurses. Medical Problems[ edit ] Doctors and medical personnel can assist the guerrilla effort in three capacities, which are a function of the growth and sophistication of the guerrilla territory. In the first case, doctors must fight alongside the guerrillas, operating as field medics.

As territory expands, it is possible to establish medics at safe houses. Upon further expansion of the guerrilla territory, it is possible to establish legitimate hospital facilities, with proper equipment and infrastructure.

Sabotage[ edit ] Sabotage, again distinguished from terrorism, is an important adjunct activity in war, alongside direct combat. Important targets include supply lines railroads , infrastructure bridges, which can be destroyed using dynamite and communications telecommunication lines can be crippled by felling a single pole. War Industry[ edit ] The developed guerrilla territory must begin to perform its own legitimate manufacturing; again, essential manufacturing processes for the war effort include shoe production and repair, weapons production and repair in an armory , and salt manufacturing.

Propaganda[ edit ] Propaganda must also be disseminated both inside and outside the guerrilla territory; appropriate media include newspapers and radio. Intelligence[ edit ] Good intelligence is essential to obtain before engaging in any battle, and it may be acquired from friendly peasants, or by eavesdropping on the enemy. Again, women make particularly good spies for this sort of intelligence gathering.

Training and Indoctrination[ edit ] In its early stages, the war itself and its experience will train the guerrillas; only at later stages does it become feasible to establish dedicated training camps for new recruits.

Training must include marksmanship and political indoctrination. The Organizational Structure of the Army of a Revolutionary Movement[ edit ] Like a regular army, a guerrilla army must also have a clear chain of command, and military discipline.

When a punishment is deemed necessary, it must be painful. The reason for this is that guerrillas, unlike regular armies, are already accustomed to extreme daily hardships. However, such a punishment need not be physical: for example, depriving a guerrilla of his weapon can wound his pride and cause the desired corrected behavior.

Two appendices further detail guerrilla military operations. Organization in Secret of the First Guerrilla Band[ edit ] Before the first guerrilla group commences its military operations, careful planning is essential. Bases, safe houses and supply caches must be established at multiple locations, and information must be tightly controlled and specialized among a few people, with no one knowing all details of military operation, so that it will be impossible for all secrets to be obtained by the enemy in the event that a given person is captured and tortured.

The guerrillas must also physically disperse themselves throughout the countryside, so as not to call attention to themselves.The revolution's detrimental impact on the United Fruit Company and other capitalist interests are also mentioned. The guerrilla fighter who carries this equipment will have a solid house on his back, rather heavy but furnished to assure a comfortable life during the hardships of the campaign. A canteen or a bottle for water is essential, since it will frequently be necessary to drink in a situation where water is not available.

There are extraordinary cases of children who as combatants have reached the highest ranks of our rebel army, but this is not the usual case. Although he identifies the United States as an enemy, Guevara closes with optimism for the future of Cuba.